

PALATABLE SHARIA 'Killing Two Birds with One Stone'¹

Hakimul Ikhwan

Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

email: hakimul_ikhwan@yahoo.com

Abstract

Based on observation in the District of Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia shariatization was a form of local re-packaging sharia where the term 'sharia' has been replaced with 'Akblaq al-Karimah' (noble character). It then had the effect of not only silencing critical groups but also moderating sharia to become more open and inclusive. More importantly, the local-branded sharia became a common ground for the various Islamist groups to coalesce and, indeed, suppress vigilante action to renounce violent threat, at the very least, and served to lessen the divides between them. In this regard, the so-called sharia was like 'killing two birds with one stone' that on one side was a form of moderation to the critical groups but, on the other, was designed to be a common ground for various Islamist groups to coalesce.

[Berdasarkan penelitian di Kabupaten Cianjur, Jawa Barat, shariatisasi di Indonesia telah mengambil bentuk lokal dengan mengganti istilah 'shariah' dengan 'akblaq al-karimah'. Hal ini tidak hanya membungkam kelompok kritis, tetapi juga memoderasi syariah menjadi lebih terbuka dan inklusif. Terpenting adalah lokalisasi syariah menjadi landasan bersama bagi berbagai kelompok Islam untuk berkoalisi, dan alih – alih menekan aksi massa yang bisa menimbulkan kekerasan, dan yang menimbulkan perpecahan diantara

¹ First draft of this paper was presented at International Conference on *Growing Religious Intolerance in Indonesia: Outlook, Challenges, and Future Trajectory of Indonesian Religious Life* organized by Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore and Pascasarjana UIN Sunan Kalijaga, in Yogyakarta on 24-25 September 2015.

mereka. Dalam hal ini, perumpamaannya seperti 'sekali lempar, dua burung terjatuh', yang mana satu sisi merupakan bentuk moderasi kelompok kritis, satu sisi yang lain menjadi pondasi bersama koalisi berbagai kelompok Islam.]

Keywords: shariatization, localizing, moderation, coalesce

A. Introduction

Following the downfall of Suharto in Mei 1998, Indonesian society had rapidly developed social and political structures supportive of the process of democratization. It, in turn, provided unprecedented ground for Islamists to push for sharia law to take place. It was reflected in somewhere between 78 and 168 regulations across not less than 52 districts and municipalities enacted between 1999 to 2009.² Actually, the increase in shariatization amidst democratization was not only happened in Indonesia but was also the case in many other Muslim majority countries experiencing democratization such as Pakistan in 1960s, Afghanistan and Egypt in 1970s, Turkey in 1980s, Central Asia in early 1990s, and Nigeria and Yemen in late 1990s.³ In this regard, shariatization is viewed as a direct product of the process of democratization.⁴ It was not necessarily indicating incompatibility of Islam with democratization neither reflecting the low quality of democracy as argued by Bush⁵ and Buehler.⁶ In fact, amidst the growth of sharia regulation Indonesian democracy has still simultaneously developed and indeed been globally praised as an astonishing success and even seen as a “miracle.” Since 2006

² Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”, in *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. by Greg Fealy and Sally White (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2008), pp. 174–91; Michael Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing ‘Shari’a’ Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces”, *Comparative Politics*, vol. 46, no. 1 (2013), pp. 63–82.

³ Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties”.

⁴ Arskal Salim, *Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), p. 2; Nadirsyah Hosen, *Shari’a and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2007).

⁵ Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”

⁶ Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties”.

to 2013 Indonesia had still been the only country considered “free” in Southeast Asia.⁷

The persistence of development of democracy along with the growth of shariatization would seem, then, to put into question a number of dominant contemporary discourses on their incompatibility.⁸ To examine the co-existence of shariatization and democratization, the author did in-depth qualitative fieldwork research in the District of Cianjur West Java, Indonesia. Cianjur was chosen as it represented a ‘hard’ or ‘critical’ case study concerning the interrelationships between democracy and shariatization in favour of four reasons. First, Cianjur regarded as a front-line of initiation of sharia-oriented regulations at the local level in Indonesia post-Suharto. Second, Cianjur was known as a head-quarter of Gerakan Reformis Islam (GARIS—Gerakan Reformis Islam), which was a notable Islamist vigilante group.⁹ Third, historically Cianjur was one of the primary bases for a revolutionary movement of the Darul Islam (DI) and an Islamist party of Masyumi in the 1950s-60s. Finally, Cianjur is known as a City of Pious Muslims (Kota Santri) with about 99 percent Muslim population of the total two million inhabitants. I interviewed 59 informants from different social groups representing former Executive Head and former Vice of Executive Head, 11 government officers, 9 leaders of religious mass organizations, 5 Heads of Villages, 4 semi-state organizations, 4 Islam-associated parties, 3 national-secular parties, 3 Pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), 3 youth organizations, 3 vigilantes groups, 2 local academicians, 4 Catholic adherents, 3 Protestants, and one for each Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.

This paper argues that the Islamists might shift from one form

⁷ Freedom House, “Indonesia”, *Freedom in the World* (2013), <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/indonesia>, accessed 22 Oct 2013.

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (London: Phoenix, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Francis Fukuyama, “The west has won”, *The Guardian* (11 Oct 2001), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/11/afghanistan.terrorism30>, accessed 31 Mar 2014.

⁹ Ismail Hasani (ed.), *Radikalisme Agama di Jabodetabek & Jawa Barat: Implikasinya terhadap Jaminan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan* (Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2010).

of interpretation and application of sharia to the other following the changing in social and political contexts. The knowledge and practice of shariatization have multiple sociological dimensions that linked together knowledge reproduction over the ‘sacred’ texts — Quran, Hadith, and jurisprudence — and social practices of the ‘profane’ world of the ‘present’ days that linked to the ‘past’ and oriented to the ‘future’.¹⁰ Thus, the interpretation and application of sharia were not fixed and permanent, neither it has closed meaning. Within this frame, the Islamists might repackage the symbolism of sharia into a locally acceptable term of Akhlaq al-Karimah (noble character). On one side, it had the effect of silencing critical groups by moderating sharia to become more open and inclusive. In the other side, it has provided a common ground for the various Islamist groups to coalesce and served to lessen the divides between them. Thus, the arguments proposed in this paper have enriched the existent researches that view the growth of shariatization post-Suharto as a manifestation of multiple forms of dissonance,¹¹ ideological continuation of the Darul Islam (DI) and the Masyumi of the 1950s,¹² recalling the Jakarta Charter of 1945¹³, and by-product of democratization post Suharto.¹⁴

First of all, the paper will discuss the social and political context of the District of Cianjur. Then, it will elaborate the process of negotiated sharia at the local level where the term ‘sharia’ has been adjusted to the locally familiar term of ‘Akhlaq al-Karimah’ or noble character. The last part will present sociological explanation on the process of making sharia palatable as well as its impact on social formation in Cianjur in

¹⁰ Talal Asad, *The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam* (Washington D.C: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986).

¹¹ Salim, *Challenging the Secular State*.

¹² Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”

¹³ Robert W. Hefner, “Shari‘a Politics and Indonesian Democracy”, *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, vol. 10, no. 4 (2012), pp. 61–9.

¹⁴ Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties”; Michael Buehler, “Whodunit? Politicians Affiliated with Secular Parties implement most Sharia Regulations”, *TEMPO*, vol. Special Edition 10 Years of Sharia (2011); Bernhard Plattdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2009); Masdar Hilmy, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2010).

post-Suharto.

B. Negotiating the Sharia

The fieldwork research has found that interpretation over the so-called sharia, and shariatization, was not a fixed and permanent but was somewhat open and, indeed, negotiable that fluctuated in line with specific social and political contexts. It is not to suggest that sharia has lost its connection with the ‘grand’ texts — Qur’an, Hadith, and Islamic jurisprudence — and the traditions of Islam, but that these connections were subject to multiple reinterpretations. In this regard, shariatization was remarkably adaptive and accommodative, or, more precisely, it was a form of symbolic and political adjustment to the National Constitution of Indonesia, which is non-theological.¹⁵ Cianjur’s shariatization was thus a moderate form of shariatization that was developed in response to heightened suspicions and resistance from the local, national, and global critics of what they saw as the Islamisation of Indonesia.

The foremost evidence pertaining to the adaptive and flexible nature of Cianjur shariatization was a shift from the use of the term ‘sharia’ to ‘Akhlak al-Karimah’ or noble character. Thus, Cianjur Islamists shifted from the movement of ‘sharia enforcement’ to the Movement of Noble Character Development or the so-called *Gerbang Marhamah* (Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlak Al-Karimah). The *Gerbang Marhamah* had two policies. The first was related to the enactment of the ‘noble character’ movement within government apparatuses, as well as for the people of Cianjur in general. Regarding the apparatuses, the policy consisted of four Executive Head’s Orders. First, it was to require inhabitation of congregational prayers, especially the *Dzuhur* (mid-day prayer). Second, it was to encourage the apparatuses to pay for alms (*zakat*) and donation (*Infaq* and *Ṣadaqah*) on earned income. Third, it was to intensify religious preaching at government department units, and, fourth, it was to call out to the apparatuses to promote a ‘respectful

¹⁵ LPPI and MUI Cianjur, *Apa dan Bagaimana Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur: Baban Penyuluhan dan Sosialisasi bagi para petugas Akhlakul Karimah (PAK) di Kabupaten Cianjur* (Cianjur: LPPI, 2002); LPPI, *Format Dasar Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur* (Cianjur: LPPI, 2001); LPPI, *Gerbang Marhamah Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah Kabupaten Cianjur: Rencana strategis mewujudkan masyarakat Cianjur sugih mukti yang Islami* (Cianjur: LPPI, 2002).

pattern of conduct' (*Uswah al-Hasanah*) to generate an Islamic social environment. The goals of Gerbang Marhamah were to develop noble character individuals and tranquil families as well as clean and capable government apparatuses. The combination of those achievements was expected to create a prosperous and peaceful Cianjur or the so-called *baldatun thoyyibatun wa rabbun ghaafur* (a prosperous country with the blessing of God).¹⁶

Why did Cianjur's Islamists shift from using the term 'sharia' to that of the Akhlaq al-Karimah? First, although Islam is the majority religion and religious life is salient, political Islam and Islamism in particular, have not been as strong as Muslim culture in Cianjur. Cianjur is known as a City of Pious Muslims (*Kota Santri*) rooted to the 17th century when the first generation of Ulama (Islamic Scholars) introduced Islam, and since then Cianjur has been a centrum of Islamic teaching for the people in the surrounding areas. Currently, Cianjur has about 663 Pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), more than 4.000 parochial Islamic teachings (*Majelis Ta'lim*), 4.462 mosques, and 13.850 prayer premises (*Musholla*). Muslims constitute about 99 percent of the total two million inhabitants. In the year 2005, non-Muslims shared 'only' about 0.77 percent, which included Protestants of 6.693 people, Catholics of 3.592 people, Hindus of 2.109 people, Buddhists of 2.463 people, and others of 154 people.¹⁷ Despite the strong social, historical, and cultural tied to Islam, Islamist politics was much less influential in Cianjur since the independence of Indonesia in 1945. Although Cianjur had notorious Ulama who led the fighting against colonialism, none of those Islamist figures became involved in the government or served as top range bureaucrats in the early period of independence Indonesia. At that time, there were 17 districts in the West Java region, but none of the Ulama gained a position of Head of District. Those positions were all served by the proponents of the Indonesian National Party (PNI-Partai Nasional Indonesia). Indeed, in

¹⁶ LPPI and MUI Cianjur, *Apa dan Bagaimana Pelaksanaan Syari'at Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur: Bahan Penyuluhan dan Sosialisasi bagi para petugas Akhlaqul Karimah (PAK) di Kabupaten Cianjur*, p. 9; LPPI, *Gerbang Marhamah Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah Kabupaten Cianjur: Rencana strategis mewujudkan masyarakat Cianjur sugih mukti yang Islami*; LPPI, *Format Dasar Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur*.

¹⁷ LPPI, *Gerbang Marhamah Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah Kabupaten Cianjur: Rencana strategis mewujudkan masyarakat Cianjur sugih mukti yang Islami*.

the first election of 1955, the Cianjur's Masyumi obtained fewer votes than the PNI. The story was even worse in the following decades when Islamist parties lost significant numbers of constituents. In the post-Suharto era of 1998, the Islamist parties were even outside of the big three list parties in Cianjur.

Unconsolidated political Islamism in Cianjur was also underpinned by the fact that its Muslims were affiliated to widely diverse social organizations. Although Cianjur's cultural religiosity was predominantly NU, this was not reflected in the registered members or the formal branches of the organization of the NU. The people of Cianjur had strong attachments to the culture of NU, much stronger than to its organizations. Concerning registered members and branches, the NU was not even more prominent than the United Islam (PERSIS-Persatuan Islam) and Muhammadiyah—the supposedly smaller Islam-based associations. The PERSIS and Muhammadiyah controlled more notorious headquarters and schools than the NU in the Town of Cianjur. In politics, the National Awakening Party (PKB—Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) the United Development Party (PPP—Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), which were associated with the NU, had underperformed in the elections of 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014. In other words, people identified themselves as (culturally) NU, without submitting to the organization and formal structure of the NU, or being linked to its affiliated political parties.

The configuration of Islamist groups in Cianjur was more complicated in the Reformasi era than before it. Before 1998, especially in the last decade of the Suharto regime, there was only one single group of identifiable Islamists, namely those who kept a distance from the Regime and were left outside of formal politics but did not show any overt resistance to Suharto. However, in the aftermath of the Reformasi, following the opening of the 'door of freedom,' Cianjur's Islamists emerged in three main types of movements, namely the Islamist Pesantren, Islamist vigilantes, and Islamist parties.

The Islamist Pesantren were primarily concerned with the issue of traditional-religious values, culture, and morality. They worked to instigate this through various means, such as informal education and training, to deal with issues related to what they saw as the decline of values, culture, and morality. The Islamist Pesantren consisted of the associates

and social networks of *Ajengan*—a Sundanese term for respectful and charismatic religious figures—and *Santri*, that were actively involved in movements to defend local values and morality which were supposedly rooted in Islamic teaching and values. It is important to note that the Pesantren were, however, a divergent group. The Islamist Pesantren that were excluded by Suharto's regime tended to be more coercive and militant than other (ordinary) Pesantren who previously received budgetary allocation and accommodation from the government under Suharto. Thus, in my research, the use of 'Islamist Pesantren' refers to the coercive and militant Pesantren who were actively involved in the promotion of sharia enforcement and particularly against vice and immoral practices, but who were not using the violent types of action adopted by the Islamist vigilantes. The Islamist Pesantren were very concerned with what they saw as decreasing local traditional values and culture that resulted from, on one side, the devastating economic crises, work dismissal, unemployment, and, on the other side, the overwhelming euphoria of democracy as reflected, for instance, in the expansion of media and entertainment businesses. In dealing with these matters, the Islamist Pesantren took action, in cooperation with their existent networks, both within and without Islam-affiliated groups in Cianjur. As a result, they were able to expand informal Islamic education and religious training to the Cianjurians as well as employing peaceful means of movement and rejecting violent actions.

The Islamist vigilantes were chiefly represented by the Reformist Movement of Islam (GARIS—Gerakan Reformis Islam) that was employing different types of political actions to the Islamist Pesantren and the Islamist parties. They had employed vigilante types of violent threats in their actions. Thus, they used to patrol nightclubs, massage houses, karaoke bars, and vendors of alcoholic drinks. They also conducted raids during Ramadhan, a month of fasting for Muslims, targeting businesses and individuals who were deemed disrespectful to the holy month of Ramadhan. The GARIS was established in 1999. At that time, the situation was colored by severe political and economic uncertainties. Indonesian governance, especially the police and courts, were weak and

lacked legitimacy and trust of the people in enforcing the national law.¹⁸ Here, therefore, the vigilantes acted to fill the gap in legal governance. Nonetheless, vigilante Islamists were most anxious and propelled by the threat of socialism and communism that they saw as resurging amidst the moral vacuum of the Reformasi. Indeed, this anxiety was the main reason for the establishment of the GARIS.

The GARIS was founded by Chep Hernawan, an Islamist politician of the Crescent and Star Party (PBB—Partai Bulan Bintang), which affiliated to the Masyumi politics of the mid 20th century of Indonesia. Although the GARIS was established in 1999, it remained less known in public as Hernawan was busied in Jakarta serving as a treasurer of the party. In 2001 when Hernawan saw the political prospect of the PBB was less prospective to his political career and his dissatisfaction with Yusril Ihza Mahendra—a former President of the PBB—he went back home to Cianjur and started to activate the GARIS as a local vigilantes organization.¹⁹ It coincided with growing tension of local politics in Cianjur in early 2000s before the first executive head election in the post-Reformasi.²⁰ Although GARIS was a local vigilante organization, it has a strong network with other national vigilante groups such as the Islamic Front Defenders (FPI—Front Pembela Islam) and the Forum of Islam Adherents (FUI—Forum Umat Islam). The network was due to link owned by the Hernawan since he was in Jakarta and maintained a network to the national leaders of the vigilantes based in Jakarta. Besides, the GARIS was also having similar issues of concern to those vigilantes of the FPI and FUI regarding anti-communism and anti-liberalism as well as moral degradation primarily amongst Muslim youth and communities.²¹

The Islamist civilian vigilantes carried street demonstrations and extra-parliamentary movements frequently, through the means of violent threat, in their attempt to enforce Islamic values and morality. The

¹⁸ Michael Cookson et al., *Anomie and Violence: Non-truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peacebuilding* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2010).

¹⁹ Ratno Lukito, “Islamisation as Legal Intolerance: The Case of GARIS in Cianjur, West Java”, *Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, vol. 54, no. 2 (2016), pp. 393–425.

²⁰ LPPI and MUI Cianjur, *Apa dan Bagaimana Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur: Baban Penyuluhan dan Sosialisasi bagi para petugas Akhlaqul Karimah (PAK) di Kabupaten Cianjur*; LPPI, *Format Dasar Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur*.

²¹ Lukito, “Islamisation as Legal Intolerance”.

emergence of Islamist civilian vigilantes was a typical phenomenon of the immediate period of the Reformasi, whereas, in the past—before the Reformasi—the New Order regime severely burned and punished any vigilante type of movement. Under Suharto’s New Order, such groups consequently kept a distance from the State and were mainly involved in Islamic foundations or privately established businesses. It enabled them to stay mostly independent from the State during the Suharto regime.

Scriptural interpretation of Islamic texts had underpinned and accompanied the response of Islamist vigilantes to the situations in the Reformasi era. For instance, their interpretation of the Quran, 3:111 was to take decisive and assertive opprobrium for calling to the good and forbidding the evil. The Islamist vigilantes also had literal interpretations of the Hadith of “Whosoever of you sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart; and that is the weakest of faith.” The vigilante Islamists interpreted the ‘hand’ is physical actions, but the Islamist Pesantren and politicians had interpreted it as ‘a ruler or government authority’ illustrating, at the least, considerable variation in Islam and Islamism. Although scriptural understanding had underpinned a decisive form of action among the Islamists, as indicated in the field, the vigilante type of violent threats was not a permanent action. Rather, they could be changed into more ‘cooperative’ action that renounced violence once the social contexts were supportive of Islamists’ expression and demands.

Unlike the Islamist Pesantren and the Islamist vigilantes that dealt mainly with social and cultural issues, the Islamist parties focused mainly on issues related to law and constitution. Since 1999 they had been mobilizing political movements to recall the Jakarta Charter into the National Constitution. The Charter consisted of the sentence of “...the obligation for Muslims to adhere to sharia” that was previously part of the first principle of Indonesian State ideology of Pancasila but removed by Sukarno and Hatta, the First President and Vice, on 18 August 1945, a day after the proclamation of Indonesian independence. The movement to recalling back the Charter was based on Islamists’ view that it was a fundamental foundation for sharia enforcement over the Muslims of Indonesia. The Islamists were of the belief that only through

incorporating the Charter would the State have the stronger legitimacy to enforce religious morality and values.²² With this in mind, they expected that moral degradation and threats to traditional values would be part of the State's responsibility. In other words, Islamist politicians relied heavily on the State as a core instrument in dealing with multiple crises, especially related to the perception of the decline of local values and moral degradation in the period of following Reformasi. Threats to traditional values and the culture of religiosity, in the view of Islamist politicians, were not only rooted in the incapacity of the State's institutions but also related to problems of insufficient law and constitution, due to the removal of the Jakarta Charter in 1945. The Islamist politicians thus saw an attempt to re-incorporate the Jakarta Charter into the National Constitution as an attempt to solve the problem of law and constitution, to obligate Muslims to behave in accordance to sharia. Hence, the recalling of the Jakarta Charter into Constitution was seen as strengthening State authority in dealing with religious values and morality.

The expressions of Islamist parties in Cianjur were different from those at the national level, even though the local parties were part of those at the national level. For instance, the Cianjur PKB that was associated with the NU distinct to the profile of their headquarters. The PKB headquarters was widely known as politically inclusive, whereby it had refused shariatization, including the proposal of recalling the Jakarta Charter in the process of amendment of the National Constitution from 1999 to 2002.²³ Indeed, the national PKB was also one of the parties that requested Indonesian President Yudhoyono (2004–2014) to revoke sharia-related law.²⁴ In contrast to its national profile, however, Cianjur's PKB had been remarkably noticeable as the front-liners for shariatization in the post Reformasi era. It had worked along with the PBB and promoted Wasidi for the Head of District in 2001 that had accordingly led to large-scale shariatization enforcement in Cianjur.

Cianjur's politics were also unique regarding the PBB party. At the national level, the PBB had been unsuccessful in gaining a parliamentary seat in the 2009 election, following its failure to meet the

²² Platzdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia*.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Bush, "Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?"

National Parliamentary Threshold, which was 2.5 percent of the total national votes, according to the Law Number 10 the Year 2008 article 202. However, at the local-level in Cianjur, the situation was completely different, since the PBB had successfully gained three parliamentary seats, which had increased by one seat from the 2004 parliamentary election. The primary explanation for this was the strong identification with the Masyumi among local people of Cianjur. Many descendants of the NU, Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, and PUI were associated with the Masyumi. The inhabitation of the Masyumi was persistently mobilised through the reproduction of its ideology, history, and even notions of kinship relationships. Family connections or schools owned by the Masyumi-related foundation were the predominant channels through which the foundations mobilized the people of Cianjur.

Cianjur Islam-based parties were also not performing well in the elections, and they even got much fewer votes than their Nationalist counterparts in all four elections of post-Suharto (1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014). All Islamic-Islamist parties saw significant declines in popular votes from 39.7 percent in 1999 to 36.2 and 29.2 in 2004 and 2009 respectively, but then slightly increased to 30.3 percent in 2014. Out of the five Islam-based parties, only the PKS had increased their share of votes in the last four elections of post-Suharto continuously. In comparison to the Nationalist parties, the total votes of Islam-based parties were much fewer than the nationalist parties such as the Golkar, PDIP, and Demokrat Party in all four elections of post-Suharto.

In a situation of unconsolidated Islamist politics as discussed above, there was strong pressure from a number of opposing groups such as the nationalist party of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP-Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) and the Legal Assistance Association (LBH-Lembaga Bantuan Hukum) as well as some religious minority groups. The national government in Jakarta was also resistant since shariatization was considered incompatible with the national principle of Unity in Diversity (*Bhineka Tunggal Ika*). Additionally, challenges were also coming from international agencies. A number of Western ambassadors in Jakarta visited Cianjur and met with the elected Executive Head, Wasidi Swastomo, as well as with the *Ajengans* at the Cianjur Ulama Council, to question the shariatization

agenda and express objections against it. There were fears that the development of shariatization in Cianjur would be a threat to the national unity of Indonesia and its religious and ethnic pluralism. Besides, it was anxiously considered discrimination over religious minority groups such as the Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists in Cianjur, and on the other side, it was also deemed as giving privilege to dominant groups of Muslims especially regarding local budgets on various Islam-related programs. The issue of discrimination of shariatization movement over religious minority groups has also been noted by other researchers such as Abuza²⁵ and Bush.²⁶ Moreover, rejection toward shariatization was also rooted in perceptions that the proposed form of sharia in Cianjur was an expression of Arab Islam rather than Indonesian Islam. In the view of critical groups, Indonesia is a pluralistic society and not Arabia where shariatization was associated with vicious punishments such as hand cutting, death-penalty, and stoning.

The above criticism and resistance toward shariatization had put pressure on Islamist groups, including Wasidi as a Head of Cianjur Executive Office and Ajengan Halim, a Chair of Cianjur Ulama Council. In response to the criticism, the Islamists would thus have to find a local, and perhaps, diluted and more moderate formulation of shariatization that would serve to dampen suspicion and resistance to it. The Islamists then agreed to repackage ‘sharia.’ Ajengan Halim explained.

I said “well, we need to change. Do not use the terms ‘sharia enforcement.’ Let’s put it this way, a person considered as having noble character means he/she is practicing Islamic sharia. How about if we use Akhlaq al-Karimah instead of Islamic sharia?”

The replacing ‘sharia’ with ‘Akhlaq al-Karimah’ thus a form of Islamists response to criticism and resistance. Since then, the movement was no longer called as a ‘Sharia Enforcement’ but rather the Gerbang Marhamah, an abbreviation of Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah or the Movement of Noble Society Development, making this re-packaged form of sharia more palatable to critics and the

²⁵ Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 84.

²⁶ Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”, p. 175.

diversity of the local population.

Within the Islamists' framework, the shift was justifiable based on the Islamists' interpretation that the 'Akhlaq al-Karimah' was no less critical than sharia in Islamic tradition. Here, the Islamists referred to the Hadith that "Verily I (Muhammad) was sent for none other than to perfect noble character" and were thus of the belief that Akhlaq al-Karimah was the primary objective of the prophecy and the ultimate goal of Islam.

C. 'Killing Two Birds with One Stone'

The locally repackaged sharia—the Gerbang Marhamah (GM)—enabled diverse contesting groups—both the opponents and proponents of the agenda of shariatization to establish compromise and agreement to prevent hostility and reduce tensions affected by the dimension of the 'political' in Cianjur. The 'political' here refers to a situation of contestation among various Islamist groups as well as between the Islamists and the nationalists in Cianjur. Each group held its interest and agenda, and this had generated tension and hostility during the process of democratization in the District. Meanwhile, the 'politics' refers to maneuvers aimed to establish order and prevent hostility towards the 'political.'²⁷ In other words, the GM was like 'killing two birds with one stone' that on one side was a form of moderation to the critical groups but, on the other, was designed to be a common ground for various Islamist groups to coalesce.

1. *The Moderation*

There were several arguments and strategic approaches that allowed moderation of the GM. First of all, there was the argument by the Islamists that the GM submitted to the superiority of the national constitution over the people of Indonesia, including the Cianjurians. The GM took a spirit of submission to the National Constitution but, in the meantime, desired to revitalize local values, norms, and morality that were associated with Islam and embedded in the so-called Kota Santri (the City of Pious Muslim) of Cianjur. As Wasidi told;

The Gerbang Marhamah is designed to be compatible with democracy. It

²⁷ Chantal Mouffe, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?," *Social Research*, vol. 66, no. 3 (1999), pp. 745–58.

is a strategy aimed at enabling people to conduct sharia while living in the district that submits to the State's Law. It is because if we are not flexible, sharia will never be applicable... I did not want to clash sharia with the Constitution. In the Constitution, we have assured freedom of assembly and expression. I said to fellow Islamists "Don't be too extreme. Let's perceive we live in a country like America, the UK, or Europe where many are Muslims. They are neither bustling on the Constitution nor rebelling, but I am sure if they did well, they would enter paradise in the hereafter.

The question remains, however, as to why the critical groups accepted the arguments of Wasidi that the GM was compatible with democracy and the national constitution. Also, moreover, why did the other Islamists—the so-called extreme groups as stated by Wasidi above—agree to adopt a modest form of Islamism and to avoid an extreme approach to sharia enforcement? There are four possible answers to these questions. First, as has been discussed above, at that time there were heightened perceptions of crises, primarily related to the situation of lawlessness and mistrust of government apparatus, due to previous practices under Suharto's regime. Although the State apparatus itself brought the symbolism of the GM but in a period where the people were suffering from the anomic situation, and its related heightened insecurity, following the fall of the Suharto regime, the symbolism of the GM was quickly embraced by people of various groups as a response to the predicament of the New Order's overreaching economic development that had resulted in a number of social discrepancies, impoverishment, cultural degradation, and social and political instability in the late 1990s. Within this situation, the GM brought a powerful imaginary symbolism, suggesting that everyone in the Cianjur "will live happily ever after"²⁸ under the GM and thereby provided an element of security within an insecure situation.

Another explanation to the acceptance of the GM was that the GM had been constructed as synonymous with the *adat* (local customs, social habits, or practice) that had been adapted with Islam since the early process of the coming of Islam in the region in the fourteenth century. The 'nickname' of Cianjur as a *Kota Santri* has indicated that the *adat* and symbolism of Islam have, for a long time, blended together. This local

²⁸ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993), p. xiii.

adat helped to aid non-Muslim groups to accept the GM.

Next, the GM had gone through a series of consultations with various groups in Cianjur especially the religious minority groups. Through the process of consultation, the minority and critical groups were also able to express their concerns, criticisms, and anxieties about the shariatization agenda in Cianjur. Initially, the minority religious groups of Cianjur were opposing the Islamists' plan on shariatization, but after series of dialogues resulted in the shift from the usage of the term of 'sharia' to the 'Akhlak al-Karimah,' they could accept the plan. In other words, the local 'invention' of the GM had resulted in the process of dialogue and communication between various groups in Cianjur where they were able to influence its form and outcome. Although some opponent groups remained skeptical of the 'promise of happiness' of the GM, at the very least, they were becoming less suspicious of it. For example, Ketut Ngetis, the representative of the Cianjur Hindus, told me:

I and the other three [minority group religious leaders] were invited to the Cianjur Parliament to discuss the agenda of Islamic sharia. I was questioning the objective of the agenda and the clear understanding of the proposed sharia. Some [of the Parliament members] said that the agenda was intended to restore the Akhlak by religious teachings. I replied, "if so, everyone has his or her own sharia according to his/her religion." Several other discussions followed the meeting [in the Parliament]. Finally, the sharia movement becomes the Gerbang Marhamah, and thus the sharia was withdrawn. So, we could accept it.

The third explanation was that the shift from the usage of the term of 'sharia' to the GM had convinced the critical groups about the main objective of the GM, namely to deal with the perceived deterioration and crises in Cianjur following the Reformasi. In this regard, the GM was no longer seen as a threat to national ideology and constitution but, rather, it was an instrument of dealing with the matters of local values, traditions, and cultures. Ms. Musiyem, a Catholic adherent, told me that she did not see a problem and, indeed, had not experienced discrimination due to the agenda of the GM. In Musiyem's view, the so-called sharia agenda within the GM was an attempt by the Cianjur people, a Muslim majority, to deal with various issues and concerns that were widely shared by most other religious groups in Cianjur. In other words, the prominence of Islam,

and sharia, in particular, was mainly because the majority of people were Muslims with strong an identity of Islam, as reflected in their association with a Kota Santri. With this in mind, it thus is evident that the people referred to Islam and *sharia* (Islamic law) as a source of reference in dealing with their various concerns. As Ms. Musiyem told me:

Here in West Java, about 90 percent are Muslims. So, because Muslims are the majority, perhaps they promote the GM to develop a better society. I never felt being discriminated for the faith that I belong to [Catholicism]. Everything is dependent on our self, how do we behave. If we do well with others, we will have a good relationship with others.

My interview with Musiyem revealed that she and her family members were relatively secure regarding career position, and thus economic income. She and her husband worked as State Civil Servants and were able to be promoted to the expected career position, and their daughters were all already employed. Ms. Musiyem said.

About a career in bureaucracy, if we are qualified, we will be promoted. I have been twice offered for career promotion to be a Head of School. But I do not want to. There is no a constraint [of promotion] due to my religion. If in the last four years I was not promoted to be a Head of School, it was not because of religion, but rather my daughters did not allow me to serve as a Head of School. My daughters are all already employed. My husband, for instance, although he is a Christian he can be promoted as a School Observer (Pengawas Sekolah) [a bureaucratic position higher than Head of School].

Although Musiyem did not feel discriminated against because of religious faith, she then decided to wear a head veil.

There was no pressure on me [to wear a head veil], neither in my workplace nor my social community. I have been wearing a head veil in the last five years, and I do not feel under pressure [to do so]. There was a policy that non-Muslims were not required to wear a head veil, but I just wanted to wear it and am familiar with head veiled [Muslim] women as my [extended] family consisted of diverse religions [where Musiyem has been familiar with head veil-women].

It is, of course, very unusual in religious practices in Indonesia that non-Muslim women wear head veils. Ms. Musiyem's decision to wear a head veil may have indicated a personal adjustment to 'indirect'

communal pressure where she would feel more comfortable wearing head veils amidst her activities among the majority of head veiled women in the workplace. Although she said that there was no pressure upon her to wear a head veil when I further asked her feelings after wearing it, she admitted being more comfortable with head veils. She said “I feel comfortable. Before I wear it, when there was a meeting, among dozens of people, only a few were not wearing head veil. So, I felt like becoming a point of attention [by others/the majority].” Musiyem’s experience of wearing a Muslim Women’s-like head veil can also be seen as merely that people are social animals and have a strong desire to conform to those around them. Besides, the fact that Musiyem had grown up in a “Pancasila Family”—the term often used in Indonesia to denote a family, mostly an extended family, where the members belonged to different religious beliefs²⁹—had enabled her to develop a personal capacity to adjust herself to the wearing of a head veil as some of her family members were Muslims and wearing a head veil.

Considering those combinations of social forces and events, the GM thus gained acceptance from the minority religious groups. Indeed, the symbolism of the GM was such that it then actually became regarded as belonging to the teaching of all religions. Take, for example, the words of Ketut Ngetis, the central figure of Cianjur Hinduism:

Initially, they [the Islamists] wanted Islamic sharia but then changed to Akhlaq al-Karimah. The terms of Akhlaq al-Karimah are not strict sharia, but instead commonly used terms [in Cianjur] and acceptable [by people of other religions]. [The acceptance is because] All religions are promoting Akhlaq al-Karimah. The terms are just adopted merely from Arabic, which means thoughtfulness, politeness, and morality. So, we could accept [the Akhlaq al-Karimah].

The nationalist party of PDIP also finally approved the GM, although it was conditional on the extent to which the GM would ensure religious tolerance and respect. In this regard, acceptance of the GM was not just based on its symbolism, but it was also dependent on how it would be practiced. As Buldan, a member of the Cianjur Parliament of the PDIP, stated, “finally, we approved the Gerbang Marhamah, but

²⁹ See Suhadi, “*I Come from a Pancasila Family*”: *A Discursive Study on Muslim-Christian Identity Transformation in Indonesian Post-Reformasi Era* (Zürich: LIT Verlag, 2014).

it was conditional to the assurance of religious tolerance and respect.”

Furthermore, the moderation of the GM also acted to accommodate the will of the many groups that made up the Cianjur Islamists, most of whom wanted the straightforward implementation of Sharia. In this regard, the usage of the term 'Akhlaq al-Karimah,' which is in Arabic and associated with Islamist symbolism, was intended to placate Islamists who wanted straightforward sharia. It was because the term 'Akhlaq al-Karimah' was considered as representing the core spirit of Sharia according to the Hadith mentioned above. It was Wasidi's view:

The initial concept was Islamic Sharia, but it was then repackaged with Akhlaq al-Karimah [noble character]. Some Islamists were asking me, “why don't we use [the terms of] Islamic Sharia?” I replied, “this is Islamic Sharia.” It is to bridge those who want straightforward Sharia [and the critical groups].

The GM, however, was not merely of interest of Islamists but also the nationalist. It had acted as a symbolic nodal point that enabled both Islamists and nationalists to share their interests. For the Islamists, the enforcement of zakat, for instance, had a pragmatic-strategic orientation that helped to maintain their political existence in Cianjur, besides their transcendental orientation to behave in accordance to sharia. Meanwhile, in the view of the nationalist politicians, the enforcement of zakat helped to shore up power via religious channels with the Ulama as well as to increase popularity and electability in the election. Nationalists-secularists' interests in the shariatization reflected in the fact that eight out of 34 provinces adopted sharia law between 1999 and 2009 were dominated by the nationalist-secularist parties. In those provinces, the secular party of the Golkar and the PDIP won either through winning the majority of votes or through a plurality of votes, whereas the Islamist Party of PPP gathered a plurality of votes in one province, namely the Aceh Province. Here, the term of 'plurality of votes' refers to a coalition of multi-parties whereas the term 'majority' refers to a single dominant party's vote.³⁰ Research by Bush³¹ on the Districts of Bulukumba, Maros, and Dompu found that the symbolism of shariatization was employed

³⁰ Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties”, pp. 63–82.

³¹ Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”, pp. 174–91.

by an Executive Head, who found to be or suspected of corruption, as camouflage to distract public attention away from ongoing and pervasive corruption. Hefner³² also argued that the enactment of sharia laws had practical and pragmatic reasons to provide lucrative ‘protection’ services for local businesses and neighborhoods. In other words, the mobilization of sharia-related symbolism did not necessarily relate to promoting Islamic piety and law. It is worth to notice, however, that the shariatization of policy was not always positive and contributive for the development of Muslim community as it was the case in the Aceh Province. Initially, the shariatization was intended to re-invent the (prerogative) authority of Ulama especially in rural areas or the so-called ‘Dayah.’ Instead, the development of shariatization had indeed facilitated a decline in ulama authority because codification of sharia became mostly the work of the legislatures and executive officers.³³

Moreover, secularists’ support for Islamization including sharia-inspired policy was not a typical phenomenon of the post-Suharto era. During the Suharto era, especially from the late 1980s to 1990s, Suharto had enacted policies that allowed the establishment of the Sharia-based Bank Mu’amalat. Suharto also allowed Muslim schoolgirls to wear Muslim dress in schools. Moreover, a decade before this, the Suharto regime had also introduced an Islamic law of marriage³⁴. Those policies, however, were not intended merely to support Islamization but rather to strengthen the political legitimacy of the regime, at least in the eyes of Muslims, particularly the Ulama.

Contrary to Bush³⁵ and Buehler³⁶ who argued local-sharia ordinance has curtailed the democratic freedom of citizens, this paper sees it might have a substantial contributory element to the development of democracy

³² Hefner, “Shari‘a Politics and Indonesian Democracy”, pp. 61–9.

³³ Salim, *Challenging the Secular State*.

³⁴ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Robert W. Hefner, “Religion: Evolving Pluralism”, in *Indonesia beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*, ed. by Donald K. Emmerson (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); ‘Abd Allāh Aḥmad Na‘īm, *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‘a* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008).

³⁵ Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”

³⁶ Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties”.

in the sense that the dynamic over shariatization has brought different and indeed conflicting views to the table in a constitutional way. Situating shariatization of policy in binary opposition to democracy has been problematic, not only because each case of shariatization represented specific local actors’ formation and structures, but also, as has been discussed above, there was no single motivation behind the promotion of sharia amidst the processes of democratization. It was not only driven by piety orientation but also by interests related to economy, politics, and culture. Indeed, the contents of sharia-inspired regulations were not specifically Islamic, and thus the enforcement of those regulations was not based on Islamic criminal law such as the hudud penalties for theft, robbery, adultery, or other ‘crimes against God.’³⁷

The above discussion shows that the GM had been a form of moderation of Sharia to the critical groups—the religious minority, nationalist parties, and the Legal Assistance Association—as well as to the Islamists who wanted straightforward Sharia. It was constructed as a form of submission to the national constitution of Indonesia. Moreover, it had also created an imaginary symbolism amidst the continued perception of anomie, where the GM would bring the people to “live happily ever after.” The imaginary symbolism successfully gained acceptance through various hegemonic processes at both societal and state levels. At the societal level, the Islam-based groups in Cianjur were mainly socializing the GM to the people. Meanwhile, at the State level, more precisely the local government, the Executive Office employed its legitimate authority in the so-called ‘forum of socialization’ to gain a ‘consent’ by the people or, at the very least, lessen resistance from them.

2. *The Coalescence*

The GM had also functioned as a common ground of coalescence among various Islamists and Islam-based groups in Cianjur. It is important to note that despite the above Islamism-oriented programs, the coalescence of various Islamist groups was not immediately achieved, but it instead took place over time through a series of social processes. In the first place, there was still doubt among some Islamist politicians whether to support the GM or not. It was mainly because, in their view,

³⁷ Hefner, “Shari’ah Politics and Indonesian Democracy”.

the various programs of the GM were considered as merely ceremonial and superficial. The programs were seen to lack substantive meaning and therefore would not have an eminent impact on the people. Dadan, the former MP and President of Cianjur's PKS, explained this:

I think the GM did not change anything. The atmosphere [created by the GM] was merely ceremonial. For instance, it was about to enforce women Civil Servants to wear head veils. There was an instruction of Head of District on congregational prayer. There were various Islamic festivities such as Mauled and Rajaban. I think these all were superficial. We knew that Muslims [ordinary people] liked to have festivities and carnivals as if Islamic atmosphere was great, but in fact, it had no substantive meaning.

Nonetheless, critiques of GM by some groups of Islamists did not persist. It was because the GM had been developed, along with strengthened reconstruction of Cianjur's identity of a Kota Santri, following the enactment of the Local Autonomy policy in 2000. The policy did not only consist of the delegation of substantial authority from the Central Government to the Local area, but it also represented a growing local social-political identity. In this regard, the promotion of the GM and the Kota Santri were like two sides of the same coin. The local programs of the GM were almost inseparable from attempts to revitalize the local identity of the Kota Santri. The enforcement of the GM programs brought an imaginary state affair where retention of the local traditions, culture, and values associated with the Kota Santri were conceivable, and which thus undermined the Islamists' perception of moral degradation following the crises and 'euphoria' of democracy.

The affinity of the GM to the Kota Santri, especially about local identity, had generated self-identification and indeed self-determination that framed the congruence of the previously opposed Islamist groups. Thus it seemed there was no reason for any Islamist group in Cianjur to not support the GM, which had employed religious symbolism of Islam which brought various groups to recognize others as brethren connected via commonly understood symbols, ideas, and notions³⁸ especially in the era of local autonomy. Through the GM and the reconstruction of the Kota Santri, however, the people of Cianjur drew on the long history

³⁸ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008).

of the region and perceived that they were somehow historically and culturally related.

Also, the Islamists' attempt to draw lines of historical connection was very effective in reconstructing forms of subjective identification between the people of Cianjur. As Connor³⁹ has suggested, subjective identification is indeed more powerful than a common language and religion in bringing people together. It is reflected in the fact that although Cianjur belongs to the Sunda ethnic—an ethnic sentiment originating in Western Java—there was also a strengthening of Cianjur identity in the post-Reformasi era. It was especially so when local autonomy was granted to the area, which viewed Cianjur as having its own local specific culture and thus a claim to be unique in comparison to the Western Javan Sundanese in general. It provided political foundations (and justifications) for the local people to submit to political authority within a single administrative border of Cianjur and who had refuted any attempt for regional diffusion (*pemekaran wilayah*), as commonly happened in many other districts and cities in Indonesia following the enactment of Local Autonomy policy. Through the reproduction of a 'common' identity of Cianjur, the rich Northern part had withdrawn from the agenda of regional diffusion (*pemekaran wilayah*), which allowed across transferred budget to the less income-generating areas of the Cianjur's Southern part.

This coalescence had also affected the form of expression, especially among the Islamist vigilantes, to renounce violent types of actions. As they were working in cooperation with broader groups of Islamists and Islam-based organizations, and had thus been brought into the mainstream political system, vigilante violence was suppressed. Moreover, the renouncement of vigilantism was also underpinned by the responsiveness of the local office to 'any report' about vice and immoral businesses, which had appealed strongly to the vigilantes' religious sentiments. Wasidi gave assurances to take action against any improper businesses and practices. In the meantime, he would also take decisive action on any group(s) that committed vigilante violence and used anarchic practices. As he told.

The Islamist vigilantes were always accompanied by the [National] Police

³⁹ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

and the [Local] Civil Polices [in their action under the GM]. If they practiced anarchy, we would penalize them. I said to them “if you had information, for instance, about [an under-cover] nightclub, report it to the government, and we would ask the Civil Police to take action, together with you [the vigilantes]. I pulled down improper billboards, naked advertisements, and also alcohol-related commercials. I also penalized the nightclub and prostitution houses. It was because the social environment is an urgent matter [in developing noble morality to the people].

Wasidi’s words indicate that the decline of violent threats was because the local office became responsive and took responsibility in dealing with vice and immoral businesses and practices. Before Wasidi’s administration, in a situation of relative or, perceived, anomie, the Islamist vigilantes felt that they were alone in taking responsibility for local traditional values and morality. However, since the GM had been incorporated into local government policies, the vigilante type of violent threats was subsumed under the common platform of the GM led by the local office. This situation had led to a decline in street anarchism and violence. Indeed, the vigilantes began to work in cooperation with the police and government apparatus.

The coalescence under the GM had also enticed the previous politically-excluded Islamist groups to become re-involved in more institutional forms of political activism and the policy-making process. Prior to the reformasi of 1998 and until couple years after the Reformasi, there were some Islamists who refrained from political activism. However, the social and political developments in Cianjur, especially after 2001 when Wasidi was elected for the Office, had enticed many Islamists to become involved in formal politics and democratic processes. Regarding deepening democracy, this tendency gave a very positive signal for future development especially that related to broad and substantive participation among diverse groups within society. Harun, a previous proponent of the Masyumi, stated:

In Cianjur, I was the most frequently detained-person by the police and military in the New Order. It was mainly because of my preaching [that was not in favor of the Regime]. I never participated in the election and local politics until Wasidi ran for Office.

Wawan, a President of the Cianjur’s PUI, had stayed away from

the local office and policy-making processes until Wasidi successfully controlled the Office in 2001. Since then, Wawan had engaged with the office and participated in the policy-making process. Indeed, he had become a member of the Cianjur Ulama Council that worked closely with the executive office. Wawan explained.

I was utterly never getting in touch with the so-called Cianjur Executive Head until I heard about Wasidi. When he declared the GM, I and probably all the pesantren felt that there was a synergy between the goals of pesantren and the government in amar makruf nahyi mungkar [calling the right and forbidding the wrong], as if at that time we had a father [Wasidi]. Since then we started to participate and give input to the government. Indeed, District Head used to ask for our advice/suggestions.

The GM had created a form of symbolism that generated coalescence between the previously fragmented Islamist groups—the Pesantren, parties, and vigilantes—to become unified under the common agenda of the GM. This was an unprecedented coalescence among the Islamists, which did, however, encounter problems because of their inexperience in maintaining such a union between them. As a result, the coalescence began to erode when the Islamists faced the next election of 2006, where they failed to be re-elected, causing the later decline in shariatization in Cianjur.

D. Concluding Remarks

The growth of shariatization in Cianjur did not necessarily indicate the incompatibility of Islamists with the newly developed democratization. It was a manifestation of local attempts to reinforce local values, norms, and morality in a temporary period of anomie, where the new state was weak and perceived as unable to provide local security and support for the poor in the 'post crises' situation of the time. Since Cianjur was known as a Kota Santri, it is evident that religion or religious teaching and values had become one of the major sources of reference for a common bounded morality in the region, and it was the symbolism related to this that was utilised to bring an element of coalescence amongst the various plural interest groups of Cianjur.

Bibliography

- Abuza, Zachary, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, London: Routledge, 2007.
- Asad, Talal, *The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam*, Washington D.C: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986.
- Buehler, Michael, “Whodunit? Politicians Affiliated with Secular Parties implement most Sharia Regulations”, *TEMPO*, vol. Special Edition 10 Years of Sharia, 2011.
- , “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing ‘Shari’a’ Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces”, *Comparative Politics*, vol. 46, no. 1, 2013, pp. 63–82.
- Bush, Robin, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?”, in *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. by Greg Fealy and Sally White, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2008.
- Connor, Walker, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Cookson, Michael et al., *Anomie and Violence: Non-truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peacebuilding*, Canberra: ANU Press, 2010.
- Freedom House, “Indonesia”, *Freedom in the World*, 2013, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/indonesia>, accessed 22 Oct 2013.
- Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992.
- , “The west has won”, *The Guardian*, 11 Oct 2001, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/11/afghanistan.terrorism30>, accessed 31 Mar 2014.
- Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Hasani, Ismail (ed.), *Radikalisme Agama di Jabodetabek & Jawa Barat: Implikasinya terhadap Jaminan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan*, Jakarta: Setara Institute, 2010.
- Hefner, Robert W., “Religion: Evolving Pluralism”, in *Indonesia beyond*

- Subarto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*, ed. by Donald K. Emmerson, Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
- , *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- , "Shari'a Politics and Indonesian Democracy", *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, vol. 10, no. 4, 2012, pp. 61–9 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2012.739889].
- Hilmy, Masdar, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2010.
- Hosen, Nadirsyah, *Shari'a and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2007.
- Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
- , *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.
- Kedourie, Elie, *Nationalism*, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993.
- Lewis, Bernard, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, London: Phoenix, 2004.
- LPPI, *Format Dasar Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur*, Cianjur: LPPI, 2001.
- , *Gerbang Marhabah Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah Kabupaten Cianjur: Rencana strategis mewujudkan masyarakat Cianjur sugih mukti yang Islami*, Cianjur: LPPI, 2002.
- LPPI and MUI Cianjur, *Apa dan Bagaimana Pelaksanaan Syari'at Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur: Bahan Penyuluhan dan Sosialisasi bagi para petugas Akhlaqul Karimah (PAK) di Kabupaten Cianjur*, Cianjur: LPPI, 2002.
- Lukito, Ratno, "Islamisation as Legal Intolerance: The Case of GARIS in Cianjur, West Java", *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, vol. 54, no. 2, 2016, pp. 393–425 [http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2016.542.393-425].
- Mouffe, Chantal, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?", *Social Research*, vol. 66, no. 3, 1999, pp. 745–58.
- Na'im, 'Abd Allāh Aḥmad, *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future*

- of Shari‘a*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008.
- Platzdasch, Bernhard, *Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2009.
- Salim, Arskal, *Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008.
- Suhadi, “I Come from a Pancasila Family” : *A Discursive Study on Muslim-Christian Identity Transformation in Indonesian Post-Reformasi Era*, Zürich: LIT Verlag, 2014.