BEFORE THE ETHICAL POLICY
The Ottoman State, Pan-Islamism, and Modernisation in Indonesia 1898–1901

Frial Ramadhan Supratman
Institute of Social Sciences, Istanbul University, Turkey
email: frialramadhan1@gmail.com

Abstract

By drawing on Ottoman-Turkish documents in the Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives, this paper investigates the role of the Ottoman state and Pan-Islamic ideology on modernisation in Indonesia. The article revisits the process defining the Ethical Policy (Politik Etis) as the turning point of the emergence of modernisation in Indonesia. In existing scholarship, the 'Ethical Policy' became the grand narrative in Indonesian history, meanwhile the influence of Pan-Islamism is only seen as the unsuccessful political propaganda of Abdulhamid II on the anti-colonialism movement in Indonesia. Many Indonesian and Ottoman historians view Pan-Islamism in the context of anti-colonialism fighting against the Dutch militarily in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This article proposes an alternative view to this narrative which acknowledges Pan-Islamism as a modernisation step for Indonesians which was signed by the Jawi students arrival in Istanbul and shows the Hadhrami community as the agent of modernisation. In short, the article shows the Ottoman influence on the emergence of the Ethical Policy of 1901 in Indonesia. [Menggunakan dokumen-dokumen Turki Utsmani yang disimpan di Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives, makalah ini meneliti peran imperium Uthmani dan ideologi Pan-Islam dalam modernisasi Indonesia. Hal itu dilakukan dengan meninjau proses pendefinisian Politik Etis sebagai titik balik lahirnya modernisasi Indonesia. Dalam literatur yang ada sekarang, Politik Etis menjadi cerita utama dalam sejarah Indonesia, sementara Pan-Islamisme

hanya dipandang sebagai propaganda gagal dari Abdulhamid II bagi gerakan anti kolonial di Indonesia. Artikel ini menawarkan narasi alternatif yang mengakui Pan-Islamisme sebagai salah satu tahapan penting modernisasi Indonesia yang ditandai dengan datangnya para mahasiswa Jawa di Istambul dan menunjukkan peran komunitas Hadhrami sebagai agen modernisasi.]

Keywords: Pan-Islamism, Ottoman, ethical policy, Indonesian modernisation

A. Introduction

In 1901, van Deventer, a man of liberal optimism, although not elected to a seat in the parliament in the Netherlands, continued working from the outside, making his influence felt. The annual message from the throne in September 1901 reflected the Christian spirit as the Queen spoke of an 'ethical obligation and moral responsibility to the peoples of the East Indies'. The message went on to express concern over the depressed economic condition of the East Indies and asked that a commission be formed to investigate this matter. From this is dated the Ethical Colonial Policy.[1] In Indonesian history, this date became the turning point of modernisation, forming Indonesians mind that modernisation of Indonesia growth of liberal optimism in Dutch Parliament. Having declared the Ethical Policy, the Dutch formed several policies whose impacts to indigenous in facing the new era in the twentieth century. Three policies relating to education, irrigation and migration were launched to develop the Dutch colony in Indonesia. Through these policies, especially in the education field, the Dutch colonial government claimed that they had implemented a liberal and humanitarian policy, enhancing prosperity, wealth and a modern life of the indigenous people. In the education field, the Dutch claimed that they had introduced the indigenous to modern education and educated them in the modern sciences.

After the Ethical Policy, the Dutch colonial government prompted the indigenous people to be modern. Charles Taylor and Benedict Anderson thought that a modern nation is an 'imagined community', as this enables an emphasis on two features of modern imagery that belong

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[1] Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (Hague: W. van Hoeve Publisher Ltd, 1970), pp. 31–2.

to a democratic state. Firstly, the direct-access character of modern society (the rise of the public sphere, market principles and emergence of citizenship). Secondly, homogeneous time for imagining the totality of individual lives that comprise a national community in which there are no privileged persons, or events and therefore no mediations. So, it needs contributions such as paying taxes and joining wars.[2]

However, in the context of Indonesian history, the opinion denies the role of the interaction process in the Indian Ocean that connected Indonesia with other regions such as the Middle East, resulting in religion becoming an important boundary of Indian Ocean states in the late nineteenth century. Even, Muslim colonial subjects who undertook the pilgrimage could never be wholly subjected to the discipline of the states.[3] Accordingly, it would be misleading to deny the interaction process of the Muslim world in the Indian Ocean on modernisation efforts in Indonesia. Therefore, we must reinvestigate the Ethical Policy of 1901 which was the turning point for the emergence of the modern elite. Many people undoubtedly played an important role in the modernisation, however, they were frequently forgotten by historians as many of them were predominated by economic-based analyses that showed the indigenous people had suffered under capitalism pressure. With the Dutch having issued the Agrarian Act in 1870, many scientists underscore the effects on economic conditions such as famine and poverty. Therefore, the Ethical Policy comes to be seen as the recompensing politic (*Politik Balas Budi*) over poverty and economic gaps that occurred in society. Secondly, scientists predominantly deny a transnational approach to analysing modernisation processes in Indonesia. Social and economic history approaches became the popular form of analysis in developing an argument.

Meanwhile, studies regarding social and intellectual history are characterised by peasant rebellion and messianic movements such as works by Sartono Kartodirdjo,[4] although Onghokham emphasises that

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[2] Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 2–3.

[3] Sugata Bose, *A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 195.

[4] Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Pemberontakan Petani Banten 1888* (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1984); Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Ratu Adil* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984).

the taxation system-based analyses are useful, rather than viewing rebellion in the context of a messianic movement.[5] The problem in social and intellectual history especially regarding Islam, is that it is always viewed as a radical movement to drive the Dutch from Indonesia. Ideology *jihad* and Pan-Islamism are considered as the way to stir anti-colonialism.[6] It is a problem to see Pan-Islamism as a form of modernisation and alternative ideology in the late nineteenth century.

Influenced by Orientalist's views such as Snouck Hurgronje, Pan-Islamism is considered to have an anti-colonialism spirit among Indonesian scholars. In short, Pan-Islamism is seen as a violent ideology from Istanbul that spread a negative influence on anti-colonialism. Although, Snouck concludes that political leaders in Turkey keep the Pan-Islamic programme in the museum. However, he says, the holy war is still popular all over the Muslim world.[7] Even modern historian, Anthony Reid, views every Pan-Islamism movement as part of a centrally-presided international movement. He says that Turkey never presided in such a movement, and local leaders (that proposed Pan-Islamism) have been anachronistic.[8] In his article, Reid seems to deny a Turkish influence on modernisation in Indonesia because he just analyses Pan-Islamism as an anti-colonialism movement such as in the Padri War and the Aceh War, referring to his sources in the Dutch archives and manuscripts of Snouck Hurgronje. Meanwhile, in order to trace the influence of the Islamic movement in the Middle East to the nationalism spirit in Indonesia, Laffan explains Istanbul briefly. He does not scrutinise Istanbul as the centre of the modernisation process in the Islamic world, but just as the centre of the political movement. He emphasises his research on Hijaz and Cairo, whereas Istanbul politically had great influence in diplomacy and international politics by influencing the Dutch colonial government

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[5] Onghokham, *Rakyat dan Negara* (Jakarta: LP3ES: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1983), p. 60.

[6] Anthony Reid, "Pan-Islamism Abad Kesembilan Belas di Indonesia dan Malaysia", in *Kekacauan dan Kerusuhan: Tiga Tulisan Tentang Pan-Islamism Abad Kesembilan Belas di Indonesia dan Malaysia'*, ed. by N.J.G. Kaptein, C. van Dijk, and Jan Schmidt (Jakarta: INIS, 2003).

[7] Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, *Kumpulan Karangan Snouck Hurgronje / Jilid II* (Jakarta: INIS, 1995), p. 178.

[8] Reid, "Pan-Islamism Abad Kesembilan Belas", p. 2.

in Indonesia, rather than Hijaz and Cairo.[9]

Studies regarding Pan-Islamism and the late Ottoman history in Indonesia are influenced by studies in Middle Eastern states especially in Turkey. Many historians in Turkey try to connect Pan-Islamism with a political policy to fight against colonialism, as they emphsise the Caliphate and Pan-Islamic questions as anti-Western. In addition, relations between the British and Ottoman were worse and Rusia invaded several Central Asian Muslim regions. Several studies about colonialism itself deny social dynamics in colony states, only emphasising Abdulhamid's policy in the context of the Caliphate question with several symbolic roles he played.[10] Even though there are several works regarding Ottoman-Southeast Asia, those are still narrating Pan-Islamism as anti-colonialism conception in related to Dutch or British position in Southeast Asia[11]. Meanwhile, this article will investigate Pan-Islamism as a part of modernization process in Indonesia.

In short, studies about Abdulhamid are divided in two; first, some view him as a retrogade fanatic and a blot on the history of the late Ottoman state. Others view Abdulhamid as a moderniser in the tradition of the earlier Tanzimat era. However, several historians state that there is nothing incompatible between religion and modernisation.[12]

This article seeks to bring new clarity to the history of Pan-Islamism and the modernisation process in Indonesia by suggesting that Istanbul,

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[9] Michael Francis Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

[10] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Cezmi Eraslan, *Abdülhamid ve İslam Birliği: Osmanlı devleti'nin İslâm Siyaseti, 1856-1908* (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1992); Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909* (London: IB Tauris, 1989); Mümtaz 'er Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu* (İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 1991); Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877-1924* (Leiden: Brill, 1997).

[11] A.C.S. Peacock, "From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks and Southeast Asia", in *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks, and Southeast Asia*, ed. by Annabel Teh Gallop (London: British Academy, 2015); Reid, "Pan-Islamism Abad Kesembilan Belas"; Jan Schmidt, *Through The Legation Window 1876-1926. Four Essays on Dutch, Dutch-Indian and Ottoman History* (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut, 1992).

[12] Rashed Chowdhury, "Pan-Islamism and Modernisation During the Reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, 1876-1909", Thesis (Montreal: McGill University Libraries, 2011), pp. 17–8.

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as the centre of the Ottoman state, was not only the centre of politics for Muslims, but the centre of modernisation. In short, Pan-Islamism and modernisation are compatible with each other. This argument will be placed in the context of Indonesian history in the late nineetenth century. Firstly, the author will place Pan-Islamism as a modernisation process in the late nineteenth century, rather than as anti-colonialism upheaval, as Western modernisation had brought failures especially in colony states like Indonesia. So, Istanbul provided an alternative way to supervise modernisation in Indonesia. Secondly, the author will show the dynamics of the transnational process that stimulated the Dutch to launch modernisation in Indonesia. In this argument, the Ottoman state played an important role in stimulating modernisation in Indonesia. Thirdly, the author will show that the *Jawi* students' arrival in Istanbul was the turning point of the modernisation process in Indonesia. In short, Pan-Islamism was not a violent ideology that could undermine the Dutch colonial government politically, but the basic principle of the modernisation process.

Eventually, the author will argue that the Ottoman state policy in Indonesia, through Pan-Islamism, could not be identified as violence, rebellion, coercion and harshness, but it brought modernisation which could help Indonesians to adapt to changes in the international arena. On the other hand, the Hadhrami group became the first modern elite who brought modern processses to Indonesia before the emergence of the new-noblemen class (*neo-priyayi*) after the Ethical Policy. In short, as Pan-Islamism and Ottoman supervision in the modernisation process were viewed as a threat by Dutch colonials, indirectly it was stimulating the Dutch colonial government to launch modernisation projects like the Ethical Policy in order to repress modernisation supervised by the Ottoman state. The Dutch wanted to launch a modernisation process under their own patronage. Before outlining this narrative, it will be useful to review in more detail discussions about Pan-Islamism.

B. Pan-Islamism and Modernisation in the Hamidian Period (1876–1909)

In Ottoman history, the reign of Abdulhamid II is frequently viewed as the emergence of the ideology of Caliphate in domestic

and foreign policy. Abdulhamid played a symbolic role in defining his authority as Caliph, running government according to vigorous pillars such as defining the state with 'four pilllars of the state', firstly, Islam; secondly, the maintenance of the house of Osman; third, the protection of the Haram al-Haramayn; and fourthly, the maintenance of Istanbul as the capital city.[13] Historians tend to see him as a sultan that used Islam to legitimise his position. Abdulhamid came to be viewed as a traditional Ottoman corporatist sultan who wanted to create a common political identity for all citizens, regardless of faith and language and, then, to realign itself religiously, culturally and politically with the most numerous of those citizens, the Muslims.[14]

Historians argue that dealing with Muslims became the main concern of Abdulhamid II because he declared himself as Caliph. Even, in more detail, he composed the main functions of Caliph.[15] Despite being a sultan in his domain, thanks to his declaration as Caliph, Abdulhamid received solicitation of Muslims around the world to help them against Western colonialism. The Aceh ambassador's arrival in Istanbul is an example of Muslims in Indonesia who sought help to face Dutch colonialism. They hoped that Abdulhamid could intervene in the Dutch invasion of Aceh. However, it was misleading to hope that Abdulhamid would intervene in the invasion by colonialism of Muslim states.

Solicitation of help from abroad become the sign that in the Hamidian period (1876–1909) the Ottoman state came to be seen as a Pan-Islamist state presiding over anti-colonialism in several Muslim states such as India, Malaysia and Indonesia. Therefore, it will be useful to analyse late Ottoman history through diplomatic history. Hanioğlu emphasises the portrayal of Ottoman history as an integral part of the larger history of Europe and the world.[16] Therefore, he argues that migration of Muslims to Ottoman regions played an important role in defining Pan-Islamist policy in the Hamidian period, as the Muslim

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[13] Selim Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909)", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 23, no. 03 (1991), p. 346.

[14] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 4.

[15] Eraslan, *Abdülhamid ve İslam Birliği*, pp. 199–200.

[16] Mehmed Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 4.

proportion of the Ottoman population had grown to 73.3%.[17] Hanioğlu explains that the keys to understanding the Hamidian period are loyalty to the sultan and re-invention of tradition.

Many historians and social scientists deny the intertwining of Pan-Islamism and modernisation in the Hamidian period, as they identify political Islam, so-called Pan-Islam, with anti-colonialism, anti-progress, tradition and being the product of the medieval period. Some of them link Pan-Islam with several Arabs surrounding Abdulhamid II who had ambition to face European states militarily such as Sayyid Fadl.[18] Undobtedly, Pan-Islam ideology in this context cannot be plausible, as supporters of such Pan-Islamism like Sayyid Fadl wanted the Ottoman to act militarily against the British, meanwhile the Ottoman state tried to avoid conflict with European states, including the British in the Indian Ocean.[19] Another view, influenced by Pan-Islamism, sees Abdulhamid as a despotic (*istibdad*) sultan, running censhorship over the Ottoman press.[20]

İt will be misleading if we view Pan-Islamism merely as a product of the Caliphate question, authoritarian, anti-colonialist and anti-modernisation. Talal Asad argues that religion is not absent in the public life of the modern nation-state.[21] Pan-Islamism was also part of modernisation in the late nineteenth century. At that time, the Ottoman state witnessed how Western states, such as Britain, colonised the Ottoman domain similar to Egypt in 1882. In addition, Britain also launched a colonialism policy in Muslim states such as East Africa, India and Malaysia. Not only Britain, France also invaded the Ottoman domain in North Africa and the Dutch invaded Aceh. Neither did the Ottoman receive help from Muslim states such as Aceh. Accordingly, the Ottoman state needed to form an alternative ideology to stabilise its domain and launch good foreign affairs. In this context, Pan-Islamism

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

[18] Jacob M. Landau and Brigitte Boyce, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, vol. 45 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 71; Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, "Abdülhamid and Sayyid Fadl Pasha of Hadramawt: an Arab Dignitary's Ambitions (1876–1900)", *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, vol. 13 (1993), pp. 227–39.

[19] Ulrike Freitag, *Indian Ocean Migrants and State Formation in Hadhramaut: Reforming the Homeland* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003), p. 79.

[20] Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), p. 3.

[21] Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, p. 5.

was a plausible way to overcome problems in its domain and abroad. In this period, Abdulhamid II sucessfully reverberated and re-invented tradition. Therefore, Pan-Islamism was the best choice of principle in Ottoman policy. According to Aydın, Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian ideas emerged after the liberal Westernised moment in Ottoman and Japanese reformist thought. Their genesis was closely related to a break in the Asian's elite perception of the west. The global image of the West altered dramatically during the 1880s following the European scramble to colonise Africa in the aftermath of the British occupation of Egypt. On a global scale, the period from the early 1880s to 1914 was both the peak of European imperial expansion and the formative period of modern social sciences in Europe.[22]

Despite reverberating and re-inventing tradition, Sultan Abdulhamid II was also a product of Tanzimat. In short, he was a part of the historical process of Ottoman history. He grew up during the middle of the nineteenth century. Either was he impressed with modern life in Europe. He visited Europe with his uncle, Sultan Abdulaziz. In the early period of his reign, Abdulhamid was attracted to modern political systems such as parliament, though he eventually banned parliament. However, he was very concerned about the education field. Modern schools with French as the language of instruction were opened during his time. Launching an education policy for women, he opened the first modern university in Turkey, Dar-al-Funun (now, Istanbul University) in 1870. Since Maarif Nizamname was declared in 1869, the Ottoman state began to modernise the education system, dividing education into five levels; Sibyan, Rustiye, Sultaniye and Darulfunun.[23] In particular at Sultaniye school, French became the main language of science. The Ottoman state adopted French, not only in diplomatic activities, but also in education. Even France as a state prompted the creation of Mekteb-i Sultaniye.[24] Sultaniye was established because the graduates of *Rustiye* school could not directly learn at Darulfunun. The system of the Sultaniye school provided education for five years, however students who did not have

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[22] Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 39.

[23] Ahmet Cihan, *Osmanlıda Eğitim* (İstanbul: Akademik Kitaplar, 2014), p. 17.

[24] Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire 1839-1908* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 17.

adequate intellectual skills had to join matriculation for three years. In short, it required eight years before studying in Darulfunun.[25] Apart from Darulfunun, Abdulhamid also established modernisation of education through the establishment of economic growth and public welfare, such as the establishment of a school of finance in 1878; a school of fine arts in 1879; a school of commerce in 1882; an engineering school in 1884; a veterinary school in 1889; but also keeping the interests of the state in mind, a police academy in 1891 and a school to train customs officers in 1892.[26] In short, through modern education, Abdulhamid II as Caliph, had an agenda to centralise his domain, modernising Ottomans and Muslims beyond the Ottoman domain.

On the other hand, to centralise Ottoman domains and connect people with the capital city, the Ottoman built telegrams and the Hijaz Railway. Those were the most advanced technologies of the time. Accordingly, Pan-Islamism policy as the principle ideology in his policy created tremendous projects. The Hijaz Railway was a necessity of the Ottoman state, as the agenda of modernisation and Pan-Islamism had to be centralised. In order to pursue the purpose of modernisation the Hijaz Railway was the main solution. Abdulhamid needed to reinforce the presence of the Ottoman state in Hijaz, especially given British and Italian control of the western shore of the Red Sea.[27] According to Chaudury, control of Hijaz was crucial if the Ottomans wanted to retain the Caliphate and not lose it to a British-backed Arab pretender.[28] Therefore, in the Hijaz Railway project, centralisation was an important issue to regain control of the Ottoman domain in the hands of the sultan in Istanbul.

In sum, Pan-Islamism became the main principle of modernisation of the Ottoman state, as the state had to control and centralise its domain. However, to be Caliph, Abdulhamid also had to make good foreign policy. Therefore, the mission of Ottoman foreign policy was based on Pan-Islamism and the modernisation effort. In order to pursue the mission, the Ottoman state sent consuls abroad to attract Muslims from various

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[25] Ömer Faruk Yelkenci, *Türk Modernleşmesi ve II. Abdülhamid'in Eğitim Hamlesi* (Üsküdar, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2010), p. 107.

[26] Chowdhury, "Pan-Islamism and Modernisation", p. 282.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 277.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 326.

states, in particular Indonesia (Netherland East Indies). Several scientists consider that the presence of the Ottoman state in Indonesia could create an anti-colonialism movement. However, the anti-colonialism movement in Indonesia during the nineteenth century never obtained military intervention from Istanbul. Even indigenous people in Indonesia just 'brought' the Ottoman's name (*Raja Rum*) as the only legitimate power to enhance the anti-colonialism spirit. For instance, Jambi Kingdom or Minangkabau Kingdom in Sumatra both always purported that their founder was Turkish.[29] Therefore, until now, we cannot admit that the Ottoman state supported Indonesians in order to oust the Dutch colonial government. Accordingly, the Ottoman influence on anti-colonialism was as moral support through modernisation. The presence of the *Jawi* students in Istanbul and the Hadhrami connection became the important evidence that the Ottoman state tried to modernise Indonesia through the Hadhrami group.

C. *Jawi* Students and Modernisation

Pan-Islamism and modernisation of the Ottoman state in Indonesia could not be separated from the initial solicitation by the Aceh envoy to Istanbul to help Aceh with military support prior to the Hamidian period.[30] Although Aceh failed to win military support, the Ottoman state began to give attention to Southeast Asia. The Ottoman state opened a consulate for the first time in Singapore in 1864, thereafter in Batavia in 1883.[31] The first Ottoman consul in Southeast Asia was Syed Abdullah el-Juneyd. He was appointed as Ottoman ambassador to Singapore in 1864.[32] He was a descendant of the Hadrami people who lived in Singapore. Singapore was the center of the Ottoman movement in Southeast Asia because the British government gave more freedom to the movement than the Dutch

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[29] Vladimir Braginsky, *The Turkic-Turkish Theme in Traditional Malay Literature: Imagining the Other to Empower the Self* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 75–95.

[30] İsmail Hakkı Kadı, A.C.S. Peacock, and Annabel The Gallop, "Writing History the Acehnese Embassy to Istanbul, 1849-1852'", in *Mapping The Acehnese Past*, ed. by R. Michael Feener, Patrick Daly, and Anthony Reid (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011), pp. 163–81.

[31] Ismail Hakkı Göksöy, *Güneydoğu Asya'da Osmanlı-Türk Tesirleri* (Isparta: Fakülte Kitabevi, 2004), pp. 94–5.

[32] *Ibid.*

East Indies under Dutch government. Many migrants, especially from Hadhramaut, came to Singapore in the nineteenth century. Many Hadrami came from Hadhramaut to Southeast Asian cities such as Singapore, Batavia, and Surabaya to seek opportunities, commonly as traders.

Actually, the opening of the Ottoman consulate in Singapore made the Dutch anxious because the Dutch considered the consulate tp be a symbol of unity of Muslims and could, therefore, act as a catalyst in reviving the Muslim spirit to fight against Dutch colonial power. Following the death of the first Ottoman consul in Singapore, Dutch requested the British to obstruct the presence of Ottoman consuls.[33] However, the Dutch could not fully refuse an Ottoman presence in Southeast Asia because the Dutch had an economic relationship with Ottoman. Opium was an important product that was brought by Dutch agents from Izmir to Java. The sale of opium in Java and Madura—which became the company's major activity as far as the drug trade was concerned—was implemented through a farming system. It consisted of leasing—often for a limited period—the right to collect taxes or to sell goods which were subject to a government monopoly, such as opium. This system existed in Southeast Asia, including Siam (Thailand), Vietnam, Pinang, several Malayan states, Singapore, and a number of islands of the Indonesian Archipelago.[34]

Both in Singapore and Batavia, the Ottoman state trusted the position of consul to the Hadhrami family who had experience in Southeast Asia. For the first time, the Ottoman state had an open relationship with the Hadhrami group. It is the author's argument that it cannot be separated from the Hadhrami connection with the Indian Ocean and Istanbul. The wide connections of the Hadhrami group in Istanbul influenced Ottoman policy in Southeast Asia. As mentioned above, Sayyid Fadl became an important figure in the Ottoman palace as the adviser of the sultan. Thanks to the existence of Sayyid Fadl in Istanbul, many Hadhrami people could broaden their connection to Abdulhamid II's palace.

On paper, the Ottoman consul in Batavia was a commercial agent,

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[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Jan Schmidt, *From Anatolia to Indonesia: Opium Trade and the Dutch Community of Izmir 1820-1940* (Istanbul: Nederlandsch Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut, 1998), p. 26.

however, in practice, the consul was always watched by colonial authorities in Indonesia, as the Ottoman state could propagate Pan-Islamism-based military intervention to colonialism in Indonesia. In the Hamidian era, in 1885, thirteen Acehnese pilgrims delivered a petition to the Ottoman governor of Hijaz to be forwarded to Istanbul, requesting help to save their country from the invasion of the Dutch colonial government. Thus, the Ottoman consul in Batavia, Galip Bey, visited Aceh and performed Friday prayer in Baiturrahman Mosque.[35] Undoubtedly, the main agenda of the Ottoman consul in Batavia was not to propagate anti-colonialism with military intervention, but to support moral and religious spirits in order to supervise modernisation in Indonesia. Ottoman statesmen in Batavia also had another agenda despite commercial agents like donating the Holy Koran and money to Muslims. There is archive material which shows solicitation of the Koran from *ikhwan al-Jawiyun* (Jawi Brotherhood) that requsted 800 donations of the Koran from Istanbul.[36] The Sultan, as well as distributing the Koran, also donated money for the building of a mosque in Batavia in 1899.[37] A document, dating from 1898, contains a plea from Batavia for the repair of two mosques and the tomb of Şyakh al-Idrus ot al-Aydarus.[38] Donations of the Koran and money from the Ottoman state to Muslims in Indonesia for the building and repairing of schools, mosques and tombs is evidence that Abdulhamid II as Caliph fulfilled his duty.

As mentioned above, the Ottoman state in the Abdulhamid II period (1876–1909), had a modernisation agenda both in its domain and abroad. Centralisation of education and the Hijaz Railway project became evidence that Pan-Islamism and modernisation were not to fight against colonialism, but to create an Islamic-based welfare state. Therefore, to

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[35] İsmail Hakkı Göksöy, "Acehnese Appeals for Ottoman Protection in the Late Nineteenth Century", in *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks and Southeast Asia*, ed. by A.C... Peacock and Annabel The Gallop (London: British Academy, 2015), p. 93.

[36] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (henceforth BOA), HR-ID 1373-65; about Ottoman Koran in Southeast Asia see Ali Akbar, "The Influence of Ottoman's Qur'ans in Southeast Asia Through the Ages", in *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks and Southeast Asia*, ed. by A.C... Peacock and Annabel The Gallop (London: British Academy, 2015), pp. 331–34.

[37] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Y.A.HUS 400/124; BOA, Y.A.HUS 386/47.

[38] BOA, Y.A. HUS 386/40.

pursue the agenda, the Ottoman state also served Muslims abroad to strengthen the Caliphate position in Istanbul. Thereafter, the position of Caliph in launching Pan-Islamism and modernisation became vigorous in the eyes of Muslims. Accordingly Muslims abroad could support modernisation and benefit from it.

The most significant Ottoman state policy in Indonesia in the late nineteenth century was granting opportunity for *Jawi* students to come to Istanbul.[39] The term *Jawi* is used as the Ottoman archive used *'Cavalı'* to mention students coming to Istanbul at the time. Nonetheless, the *Jawi* students who came to Istanbul were Hadhrami people. However, we can see that the Ottoman state installed the Hadhrami as the representation of *Cavah* or *Jawi*. In short, the Ottoman state intended to install Hadhrami as the agents of Ottoman modernisation in Indonesia.

An archive shows that students from Batavia came to Istanbul in 1898.[40] They were provided funding for their travel expenses by the Ottoman government.[41] They were Abdurahman bin Abdulkadir al-Aydarus, Abdulmuthalib Shahab, Mehmet İhsan ve Muhammad Hasan and Ali.[42] Abdullah al-Attas also had children who graduated from Egypt. They were also sent by their father to study in Istanbul in Darüşafaka ve Aşiret Mektebi.[43] The next group of seven students was sent the following year. It included Hadhrami descendants such as Syaikh Abd al-Rahman, Abdallah bin Junayd of Buitenzord (Bogor), four sons of the Sunkar family of Batavia and one Ahmad bin Muhammad al-Sayyidi of North Sumatra.[44] Nonetheless, because of the lack of finances, several students could not learn well.[45] However, the Ottomann state also granted a reward to *Jawi* students who studied in Istanbul like Ahmad and Said Bachinid who studied at Mekteb-i Mülkiye Aşiret Sınıfı obtaining the fouth Nişan

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[39] Schmidt, *Through The Legation Window 1876-1926*, p. 221; Göksöy, *Güneydoğu Asya'*, pp. 119–127; Jeyamalar Kathirathamby-Wells, "Hadhramis and Ottoman Influence in Southeast Asia", in *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks and Southeast Asia*, ed. by A.C... Peacock and Annabel The Gallop (London: British Academy, 2015), pp. 110–11.

[40] BOA, Y.A. HUS 385/13;

[41] BOA, BEO 1107/83000.

[42] BOA, BEO 1281/87419;

[43] BOA, A.MTZ 05/5b/161.

[44] BOA, BEO 1261/94534.

[45] BOA, BEO 2689/201627.

Mecidi medal from the Ottoman state.[46]

According to these archives, *Jawi* students who came to Istanbul studied at modern Ottoman schools such as the French-based school like Sultaniye. İt shows that many of them came to Istanbul to get modern sciences and languages like French, rather than preparing an anti-colonialism agenda to bring back to Indonesia. *Jawi* students like Ahmed and Said Efendi requested to learn French after graduating from Aşiret Mektebi.[47] Having graduated from Istanbul, by all means, the Ottoman state hoped that they could propagate modern science in Indonesia, building modern education according to Pan-Islamism principles. According to Deringil, the emphasis on training a loyal and competent state elite – which would be thoroughly imbued with the values of the centre – was a basic consideration of the Ottoman higher education establishment. As stated in a circular directive from the Ministry of Education to all higher schools, students graduating from these institutions were expected to be 'of good character and breeding, ready to serve their state and country unwaveringly'.[48]

Thanks to the kindness of Sultan Abdulhamid that allowed *Jawi* students come to Istanbul and granted several donations such as repairing tombs and building mosques, the Hadhrami group in Indonesia were willing agents of the Ottoman modenrisation project. They helped the Ottoman consul in Batavia to collect money in order to help build the Hijaz Railway project. Therefore, many Hadhrami were granted medals from the Ottoman state. The Ottoman consul in Batavia granted medals to Hadhrami Seyyids such as Abdullah al-Abdu Rusulhadremi, Seyyid Nur al-Kafi, Seyyid Baidila, Seyyid Abdullah, Seyyid Abdul Kadir al-İdrus, Seyyid Muhammad Şahab and Seyyid Sahal bin Abdullah.[49] Others, such as Şyakh Ömer el-Yusuf el-Menkuşa, also got medals thanks to their contribution to the Hijaz Railway project.[50] Accordingly, it shows that Hadhrami in Southeast Asia can be called as the first modernization agent in Indonesia. Thanks to their ability in maintaining a dual identity based

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[46] BOA, I.TAL 401/23.
[47] BOA, Y.MTV 269/229.
[48] Selim Deringil, *The well protected domains,* p. 96.
[49] BOA, I.TAL 407/55.
[50] BOA, I.TAL 364/57.

on relative degree of assimilation into the host societies,[51] Hadhrami could be trusted by Ottoman as the modernization agent. As Ulrike Freitag rightly argues in her article, Hadhramis choose very different strategies to coexist with or integrate into, their respective host societies, strategies, moreover, which were adapted to a host of different circumstances.[52] The appearance of Hadhramis as the modernization agent supervised by Ottoman in the late nineteenth century can be interpreted as a part of Hadhrami's strategies to coexist in the Indian Ocean.

In short, the presence of the Ottoman state in Indonesia in the late nineteenth century provided an important contribution in paving the way for modernisation effort in Indonesia. Through education of *Jawi* students, the Ottoman state hoped that they could come back to Indonesia and propagate modern education among Indonesians, not an anti-colonialism movement. Therefore, the Ottoman state intended to supervise modernisation in Indonesia through Pan-Islamism based on modern education. Thereafter, Islam and modern science became the main foundations to establish a modern elite in Indonesia through the Hadhrami group as agents of modernisation supervised by the Ottoman state.

D. Snouck Hurgronje and Ethical Policy

The emergence of the Hadhrami group as agents of a Pan-Islamism-based modernisation evoked several criticisms from the Dutch. Snouck Hurgronje played a significant role in advising the colonial government in Indonesia. Through his ability in Islamic studies, Snouck warned the colonial government of the menace of anti-colonialism from the Islamic movement in Indonesia. Thanks to the advice of Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch colonial government could subdue hardly-undefeated Islamic states in Sumatra, namely, Aceh state.

Snouck Hurgronje was a leading Islamic studies scholar from

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[51] Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk and Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, "Introduction", in *The Hadhrami Diaspora in Southeast Asia: Identity Maintenance or Assimilation*, ed. by Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk and Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 2.

[52] Ulrike Freitag, "Reflections on the Longevity of the Hadhrami Diaspora in the Indian Ocean", in *The Hadhrami Diaspora in Southeast Asia: Identity Maintenance or Assimilation*, ed. by Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk and Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 18.

Leiden University, the Netherlands. He went to Mecca to research the influence of Indonesian Muslims staying in Mecca on the Islamic movement in Indonesia. He went to Mecca on 13 May 1885, witnessing Ka'ba (*Kabe*). After visiting Mecca, Snouck went to Indonesia, spending sixteen years (1889–1906) there.[53] In Jeddah and Indonesia, Snouck encountered several Indonesians who helped him to research Islam. In Jeddah, Snouck was helped by an Indonesian who worked in the Dutch Consulate, his name was Raden Aboe Bakar. As he was a nobleman's offspring, Raden Aboe Bakar got a good education and worked in the Dutch Consulate in Jeddah. Raden Aboe Bakar acknowledged his teachers such as Sayyid Abdullah Azwawi to Snouck Hurgronje. Thanks to connections from Zawawi, Snouck Hurgronje met several teachers and students in Mecca.[54]

Thanks to his experience in Mecca and Aceh during the late nineteenth centruy, Snouck became the leading Islamic scholar who helped the colonial government.[55] Snouck underscored the influence of Pan-Islamism in Indonesia and the ways by which the Dutch colonial government could mitigate Pan-Islamism in Indonesia. He was a supporter of colonial vision at the time. İn short, Snouck endorsed that the aim of colonial project was to bring Muslims from the Middle Ages to modernity. He did not agree with the fusion between religion and politics like in the Middle Ages. According to him, a modern civilisation is characterised by separation between religion and politics and an inclusive view of humanity. Thereafter, Snouck states that the aim of colonialism is not only to exhort economic resources from colonised regions, but also to introduce the indigenous to modernity.[56] Therefore, he declined the Ottoman Pan-Islamic policy in Indonesia, as it would

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[53] Michael Francis Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 55.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[55] Eric Tagliacozzo indicates that Snouck had much more complex role than as a mere interpreter of Islam for the uninitiated in the Western World. See Eric Tagliacozzo and Eric Tagliacozzo, "The Skeptic's Eye: Snouck Hurgronje and the Politics of Pilgrimage from the Indies"", in *Southeast Asia and the Middle East : Islam, Movement and the Longue Duree* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p. 148.

[56] Leon Buskes, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, 'Holy War' and Colonial Concerns", in *Jihad and Islam in World War I*, ed. by Erik Jan Zurcher (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2006), p. 40.

harm modernisation in Indonesia.

The tendency for the fusion between religion and politics become the main concern of Snouck Hurgronje. He says that in the late nineteenth century, many Muslims lived under the reign of non-Muslims. In the world, just ten per cent of Muslims live under an independent Muslim state. Commonly, Muslims always imagine the reign of the Caliphate and try to fight against infidel states and want to change state to be a Muslim state.[57] Here, 'Constantinople' plays an important role. Many Muslims seek to help Constantinople and present Muslim questions. According to this evidence, Turkey had a big chance to influence all Muslim states. Undoubtedly, Pan-Islamism could come from Constantinople.[58] In this commentary, it seems that Snouck Hurgronje was still suspicious of the Pan-Islamism of the Ottoman state, especially in the Abdulhamid II period. Accordingly, Snouck still considered that Pan-Islamism in Indonesia could instigate anti-colonialism which could topple Dutch rule. He did not see that the Pan-Islamism of the Ottoman state also tried to bring modernity through education and infrastructure projects.

To overcome the Pan-Islamism of the Ottoman state, Snouck criticised the colonial government for sending too many missionaries to Indonesia. He did not agree with the strategy of converting Indonesians to Christians. Indeed, Snouck underscored modern education as the proper way to colonise the indigenous in Indonesia and overcome the menace of Pan-Islamism. Education had to be the main agenda to reach stability and modernity. He criticised that education had to be given to all Indonesians, not only the noblemen classes. The people (*rakyat jelata*) also had to be a priority of the education policy.[59] With education, the Dutch could get 'good' employees to organise colony states who obeyed the rule of colonial government. In Snouck's opinion, education was the best way to supervise the separation between religion and public life especially politics:

> They (missionaries) had to be decreased because at this time, indigenous in Java and other Islam regions in Nusantara have a

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[57] Snouck Hurgronje, "İslam", in *Selected Works of Snouck Hurgronje*, ed. by G.H. Bosquet and J. Schacht (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1957), p. 47.

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] Hurgronje, *Kumpulan Karangan Snouck*, p. 183.

desire to join our culture in all fields, in which religion do not be included. Upper-class people and educated people seem to be happy in welcoming our supervision in the education field for their young generations. If they have a complaint, it has been caused by us who give them less opportunities in education field because they feel that we have emphasised education to Europeans and Chinese, rather than indigenous.[60]

Snouck tireless campaigned for 'The extermination of Pan-Islamism'. He even compared Pan-Islamism with a 'pest'. He says that the extermination of Pan-Islamism is one of the beneficial things for 'our brothers in the East'. Therefore, Snouck underscored colonial government to form 'the bigger national unity in which either indigenous in Nusantara or Dutch in Netherland feel happy inside'.[61] In short, Snouck Hurgronje advised the colonial government to form a modern state supervised by the Dutch. Undoubtedly, Snouck underscored secular education to unite the Dutch and indigenous in Indonesia:

> Islam and Christian could mingle together in national life, only if Pan-Islamism is marginalized. And we can see the benefits of this condition for our purpose.[62]

According to Snouck Hurgeonje's opinion above, he shows that the Dutch colonial policy had to be directed to the unity among Indonesians and Dutch. Therefore, he tried to create the 'same enemy' named Pan-Islamism because Pan-Islamism was considered as an anti-colonial ideology he disliked.

In short, we can see that the Pan-Islamism of the Ottoman state in Indonesia became the trigger for modernisation in Indonesia, as the Dutch launched the Ethical Policy and modernisation in Indonesia especially in the education field when the Ottoman state also launched modernisation projects in Indonesia. Therefore, we should reinvestigate again the emergence of the Ethical Policy in Indonesia. van Niel considers that the Ethical Policy in Indonesia was caused by the changes of political factions in the Netherlands where the Liberal Party had controlled politics,

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[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 182–83.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 185.
[62] *Ibid.*

so it paves the way for liberal figures like van Deventer to launch 'ethical obligation and moral responsibility to the peoples of the East Indies'. van Niel also emphasises the discrimination of Indonesians in comparison to Arabs and Chinese who had brought Dutch sympathy to the indigenous.[63]

Accordingly, secular-based education became the way to incorporate Indonesian modernity supervised by the Dutch, as it could dissociate Indonesian modernity if supervised by the Ottoman state. Benedict Anderson views secular education as the trigger for the emergence of 'imagined communities'. As mentioned above, Taylor and Anderson state that one of the prerequisites for the emergence of modern state is citizenship.[64] Undoubtedly, a government needs equality in citizenship regardless of religion. Neither did the Ottoman state declare equality between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Tanzimat declaration as the way to be a modern state. Therefore, Anderson views that schools in Batavia contributed to nationhood in Indonesia. The government schools formed a colossal, highly rationalised, tightly centralised structure analogous to state bureaucracy.[65] Thanks to the Ethical Policy, Indonesians could mingle together in Batavia, read the same book and speak the same language. Accordingly, the concept of '*inlander*' was transformed to 'Indonesians'.[66] If we agree with Anderson's opinion, we admit that the Ethical Policy influenced the nationhood of Indonesians. However, another historian reinvestigated Anderson's opinion.

Laffan underscores that the nationhood of Indonesians was formed by the connection of *Jawi* students in Hijaz and Cairo. He says that the debates about Islam and modernity in Cairo in the early twentieth century influenced Indonesian students, thereafter they brought discourses about nationhood to Indonesia. In short, he argues that Indonesian nationhood had deeper roots in an Islamic ecumenism within archipelagic Southeast Asia, made more tangible through contact with both other Muslims beyond that world and non-Muslims within it.[67] Nonetheless, in this article, we are not dealing with the nationhood of Indonesians. Either secular education or Cairo both influenced the formation of nationalism

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[63] Niel, *The Emergence*, pp. 14–32.
[64] Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, pp. 2–3.
[65] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verson, 2006), p. 121.. 121.
[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 122–23.
[67] Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, p. 3.

in Indonesia. However, we have to know an alternative argument about the formation of modernity in the Ethical Policy.

As mentioned above, through the Hadhrami, the Ottoman state tried to supervise modernity in Indonesia, educating the Hadhrami as agents of modernity in Indonesia. Therefore, we can say that the Ethical Policy was not the first modernisation attempt in Indonesia. Prior to the Ethical Policy, the Ottoman state tried to create modernisation through the Hadhrami group as agents. Therefore, the Dutch tried to counter modernisation supervised by the Ottoman state with the Ethical Policy. Neither did the Dutch counter the Hadhrami group with the emergence of the *proyayi* or noblemen group as the modern elite supervised by the Dutch. They would be a barrier used by the Dutch colonial government to prevent the influence of the Hadhrami as agents of Pan-Islamism-based modernisation supervised by the Ottoman state.

Accordingly, the Dutch tried to modernise either *priyayi* or noblemen or common people to be taught by Dutch supervision. For instance, there was an Indonesian named Abdullah Rivai, a Sumatran (Minangkabau), who received a Dutch education in the Netherlands. Gradually more Indonesians came to the Netherlands to study. When another of the sons of Notodirdjo, Notodiningrat (presently Professor Raden Mas Wreksodiningrat) arrived in Delft (1908) to study engineering he found about thirty other Indonesian students in the country. For social contact, they formed the *Indische Vereeniging* (Indies Club) in 1908, a cultural organisation, but also a podium from which new thoughts and ideas could be disseminated.[68] The Dutch seemed to have succeeded in counter modernisation supervised by the Ottoman state, as Westernised Indonesian elites educated in the Netherlands tried to engage with modernity supervised by the Dutch. For instance, Rivai also published the *Pewarta Wolanda* newspaper. The aim of this Malay-language periodical, published in Amsterdam and distributed in the Netherland Indies (Indonesia) was to 'try to decrease the influence of Turkey among many Mohammedans (Muslims) in the Indies (Indonesia)'. Intended to be distributed among Indonesian rulers, civil servants and the well-to-do classes, *Pewarta Wolanda* would do this in part by convincing parents to send their children to the Netherlands and not to Istanbul for their

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[68] Niel, *The Emergence*, pp. 49–50.

education.[69]

If we refer to Anderson, we encounter his argument that the Dutch prefer to support *priyayi* or indigenous noblemen, not Muslim educated classes, to be agents of modernity. Meanwhile, Laffan also shows that *priyayi* and local culture played an important role in overcoming the influence of the Islamic movement in Indonesia. Like Hurgronje, K.F. Holle, a Dutch in Indonesia, played a significant role on 'colonising Islam'. He devoted his life to learning the Sundanese language and campaigned for the development of the Sundanese alphabet. This latter project was his attempt to unseat the place of the widely used Arabic script which he feared enabled the Sundanese to be drawn to a foreign, dangerous and religious radicalism emanating from the Middle East.[70] Noblemen or *priyayi* were supported by the Dutch to overcome the Pan-Islamic influence in Indonesia through the Hadhrami group, as the Hadhrami group were agents of Pan-Islamism-based modernisation.

However, another historian like Laffan hesitates regarding the role of the Hadhrami in bringing Pan-Islamism for Indonesians, viewing Pan-Islamism as the 'Arab' agenda. He says that it was only in the Hijaz that the Jawa directly encountered the machinery of the Ottoman government, where it was neither well maintained nor efficient. Still, the increasing number of Jawa in Hijaz could wed Pan-Islamic rhetoric to their own aspirations for the Indies.[71] However, we have to reinvestigate Laffan's opinion, as in its documents, the Ottoman state called the Hadhrami group '*Cavalı*' rather than Arab or Hadhrami.[72] In Turkish, '*Cavalı*' means 'people of Java'. Undoubtedly, they wanted to call them *Jawi*, mentioning Hadhrami students coming to Istanbul as '*Cavalı*'. The Ottoman state also called Aceh as part of '*Cava*' when Sultan Mansyur Syah requested citizenship (*vatandaşlık*) of the Ottoman state.[73]

Thereby, the Ottoman state already considered that the Hadhrami and Muslim indigenous of Southeast Asia were not different because they were Muslims. In the Ottoman archives, Indonesians regardless

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[69] Kees van Dijk, *The Netherlands Indies and The Great War 1914-1918* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), p. 294.

[70] Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, p. 81.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[72] BOA, Y.A. HUS 385/13; BOA, BEO 1107/83000; BOA, BEO 1281/87419.

[73] BOA, HR.SYS 551–4.

of their regions or rulers were called *ahali-Islamiye* (the Community of Islam). In the archive showing the complaints of colonialism in Aceh to Abdulhamid II, the concept of *ahali-Islamiye* (the Community of Islam) is used.[74] Therefore, in the concept of the Ottoman state, the Hadhrami and Indonesians at the time had equal position, as they were classified as *ahali-Islamiye* (the Community of Islam). Of course, in the colonial concept, the Hadhrami and Indonesians were not equal because the Hadhrami was classified as *Vreemde Oosterlingen* (Foreign Orientals) like Chinese and Indonesians as '*inlander*'. Accordingly, Laffan still used a colonial system perspective in viewing the influence of the Hadhrami on Pan-Islamism.

Another argument indicating that the Ottoman state was popular in Indonesia was the existence of the *Jawi* manuscript in Indonesia regarding the Ottoman state. In the National Library of the Republic of Indonesia, there is a *Jawi* manuscript entitled *Hikayat Istambul*. The manuscript tells about the Ottoman state in the Crimean War with Russia. It shows how the Ottoman state played an important role in international politics especially with Russia.[75] The writer of the manuscript is anonymous, but at the end of the pages is the name 'Abdullah' who lived in Batavia. It seems that he translated this manuscript from Arabic to the *Jawi* language. Accordingly, the Hadhrami had an important role in propagating Pan-Islamism and the Ottoman state through the language of Islam in Southeast Asia, *Jawi*. In short, at the time, the story of the Ottoman state is not only as a myth like in Minangkabau or the Jambi manuscript when the Ottoman state is viewed as the founder of sultanates. However, it shows the Ottoman state as a real state in the international political arena.

Therefore, it is not true if we say that Pan-Islamism is below the winds (Southeast Asia) as an 'Arab' movement because firstly, the Ottoman state called the *Jawi* students in Istanbul '*Cavah'* rather than 'Arab' or Hadhrami; secondly, Pan-Islamism is not only about the Hadhrami movement, but also an indigenous movement through the language of Islam such as in *Hikayat Istambul*, therefore Indonesians also understood about the Ottoman state and participated in modernity supervised by the Ottoman state.

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[74] BOA, YA.HUS 297–35.
[75] Hikayat Istambul, BR 319, p. 199.

E. Concluding Remarks

The Ethical Policy in Indonesia in 1901 was not the only modernisation effort in Indonesia. The Ottoman state in the nineteenth century also contributed to modernising Indonesians through several policies, with the Hadhrami group as agents of Ottoman modernisation. In modernising Indonesians, the Ottoman state used Pan-Islamism as the main principle. In short, Pan-Islamism became the main principle of modernisation both in the Ottoman domain or beyond.

Unfortunately, many scholars and orientalists like Snouck Hurgronje considered Pan-Islamism as a harming ideology for colonial government, as it could instigate an anti-colonialism movement in Indonesia. Actually, debate about Pan-Islamism in Indonesia never ended because scholars and Western orientalists like Snouck Hurgronje still considered Pan-Islam as incompatible with modernity. Modernity can only be successful when religion and public life do not interact with each other. However, like Talal Asad and Chowdury, this paper argues that Islam and public life can fuse together. In short, modernity can be a success with a Pan-Islamism principle.

Accordingly, the Pan-Islamism principle-based Ottoman state policy in Indonesia in the late nineteenth century, before the Ethical Policy, brought modernisation efforts through the Hadhrami group as agents of modernisation. At that time, the Ottoman state considered that the Hadhrami and Indonesians were part of *ahali-Islamiye* (the Community of Islam), therefore regardless of ethnicity, the Ottoman state called the Hadhrami '*Cavalı*'. In short, Pan-Islamism-based modernisation in Indonesia was not only the agenda of the Hadhrami or Arabs, but all *Jawi*, Indonesians. However, modernity supervised by the Ottoman state will be different from the modernity of the Dutch. Therefore, orientalists, like Snouck Hurgronje, warned the colonial government to form a policy overcoming modernity supervised by the Ottoman state. Hurgronje proposed modernity regardless of religion in order to incorporate Muslims and Christians into one nation. Therefore, the Dutch launched the Ethical Policy to overcome modernity supervised by the Ottoman state through secular education and agents. In this policy, the Dutch preferred to choose the *priyayi* or noblemen to propagate modernisation in Indonesia.

In sum, the author argues that before the Ethical Policy of 1901, the Ottoman state had first launched modernisation efforts through *Jawi* students or the Hadhrami group. This caused the Dutch to counter this modernisation. Therefore, Pan-Islam principle-based modernisation supervised by the Ottoman state through the Hadhrami group stimulated and encouraged the Dutch colonial government to launch the Ethical Policy, modernisation launched by the Dutch through secular-based education. In short, it shows alternative arguments regarding modernisation in Indonesia during the early twentieth century. The competition between the Ottoman state and the Dutch in order to modernise Indonesians became the key to understanding modernisation through the Ethical Policy.

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