

ISLAMISM AND POST-ISLAMISM “Non-Muslim” in Socio-Political Discourses of Pakistan, the United States, and Indonesia

Hans Abdiel Harmakaputra
Boston College Massachusetts, USA
email: harmakap@bc.edu

Abstract

Islamism is defined by Asef Bayat as ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of an 'Islamic order,' in the form of a religious state, sharia law, or moral codes. However, Bayat and other scholars have found that nowadays Islamism is changing and many countries share the traits of post-Islamism instead of Islamism. According to Bayat, post-Islamism is both condition and project to “conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islam in social, political, and intellectual domains.” In short, it has a hybrid tendency to combine Islam and democracy. This paper will discuss how the category of “non-Muslim” is taken place in the socio-political discourse of Islamism and post-Islamism. To limit the discussion, there are only three examples from Pakistan, the United States, and Indonesia. [Islamisme menurut Asef Bayat adalah ideologi dan gerakan yang berjuang untuk membentuk semacam “tatanan Islam” dalam bentuk negara Islam, hukum syariat, atau pun hukum etis. Saat ini, islamisme telah berubah. Di beberapa negara muncul gejala post-islamisme yang khas. Bayat mendefinisikan post-islamisme sebagai kondisi dan keinginan untuk mengkonsep alasan dan modalitas untuk mengusung Islam ke ranah sosial, politik, dan keilmuan. Sehingga, muncul pula kecenderungan untuk menggabungkan Islam dan demokrasi. Tulisan ini mendiskusikan konsep “non-muslim” dalam wacana sosial politik terkait dengan Islamisme dan post-Islamisme. Pembahasan dibatasi pada tiga contoh dari Pakistan, Amerika Serikat, dan Indonesia.]

Keywords: islamism, post-islamism, islamic state, Islam and democracy, Islam and modernity

A. Introduction

Islamism as an ideology is comparable to any other forms of ideology that exist in the world. Asef Bayat has defined Islamism as “ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of an islamic order,”¹ which can be in the form of a religious state, shariah law, or moral codes. Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, both from Egypt, and Abu’l Ala Mawdudi from Pakistan are known as the main proponents of the ideology of Islamism.² It is debatable whether “Islamism” exists because there had been many movements that tried to establish some form of Islamic order or ruling. However, these people were prominent in constructing Islamism as a coherent system of ideology in par with others like socialism or liberalism. They also transformed socio-political movement into project to change realities.

Be that as it may, ideology is far from being static. Rather, it is dynamic and able to influence or to be influenced. As Bayat and other writers have shown, Islamism undergoes changes too; in several places Islamism gradually becomes what Bayat and others labelled as post-Islamism. Post-Islamism, Bayat asserts, is both a condition and project to “conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islam in social, political, and intellectual domains.”³ It appears as an alternative to the ideology of Islamism which is more rigid. Post-Islamism can be said a hybrid approach because it tries to fuse Islam with democracy and modernity.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the dynamic of “non-Muslim” category in socio-political discourse of Islamism and post-Islamism. While Islamism always tends to marginalize “non-Muslims,” post-Islamism take a different direction.

This paper selects examples from three countries on how, in socio-political discourse, “non-Muslim” is perceived: Pakistan, the United States, and Indonesia. First, I shall describe Mawdudi’s idea of “non-Muslim,” especially the construction of the Islamic state and the role

¹ Asef Bayat, “Post-Islamism at Large”, in *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, ed. by Asef Bayat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 4.

² Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, also highly regards by the proponents of Islamism.

³ Bayat, “Post-Islamism at Large”, p. 8.

of non-Muslims in a predominantly Muslim country. Secondly, I shall explore the context of the United States of America, in which Muslims are minority. In this, Muslims must negotiate their existence in non-Muslim society as such. Thirdly, I shall explore the context of Indonesia, in which, I shall argue, is undergoing an era of post-Islamism. To do so, I shall make use of a case study over the controversy of the installment of a non-Muslim governor of Jakarta in November 2014.

B. “Non-Muslim” in Mawdudi’s Ideology of Islamism: The Example of Pakistan

There are several definitions of “non-Muslim” in the writings of “classical” Islamist thinkers such as Hasan Al-Banna, Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb. The first definition refers to the West and Western civilization, which is usually contrasted with, or in contradiction to, Islam. Al-Banna, for instance, in his letter “Toward the Light” (1947) believes that there are two paths for Muslims to choose: Islam and the West. Each path differs fundamentally from the other and has its own particular principles, culture, procedures, and civilization.⁴ The right path, on which God bestows blessings, is Islam, toward which all Muslims should orient themselves. The West, although it used to be so powerful, is declining and encroached by many defects.⁵ This position does not mean that the West must be seen diametrically as an enemy. The second definition of “non-Muslim” can point to Muslims who chose to follow Western prescription for a government system or any ideology other than Islamism such as nationalism. Sayyid Qutb formulated a strong dichotomy between proponents of Islamism and their opponents by labelling the latter as *jahiliyya* people, which denotes pre-Islamic people who lived an ungodly life and conducted evil acts.⁶ This term *jahiliyya* then became a strong propaganda tool to oppose the Muslims who are not willing to follow Islamism agenda. Actually Qutb is not the original inventor of the usage of this term because he borrowed it from Mawdudi.⁷ The last

⁴ Hassan Al-Banna, “Toward the Light”, in *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden*, ed. by Roxanne Leslie Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (New York: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 57.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 58–9.

⁶ Sayyid Qutb, “Signposts Along the Road”, in *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden*, ed. by Roxanne Leslie Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (New York: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 138–9.

⁷ Roy Jackson, *Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam: Authority and the Islamic State* (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 175–6.

definition of “non-Muslim” indicates people of other religions beside Islam that chose to become a protected minority in an Islamic country. In this part, the focus will be on the thought of Mawdudi in perceiving “non-Muslim.”

1. *Islamic System viz-à-viz Other Systems*

According to Mawdudi, colonialism has caused Muslim countries suffered degradations. Many of them could not run an independent government without the influence of Western countries. “Nothing that was not Western could inspire confidence in them,” writes Mawdudi.⁸ For Mawdudi, many Muslim countries abandoned Islamic system of government and imitated the Western. Because of this, Mawdudi called for “universal jihad” to re-establish the true Islamic system in all Muslim countries.⁹ Mawdudi believes that outside Islam, there is no true political system. In this, he challenges all Muslims who agree with Western values such as human rights and democracy.

For Mawdudi, Islamic system is irreconcilable to non-Islamic systems. Islamic system is derived from God and grounded in God’s sovereignty (*hakīmiyya*) and humans’ submission to God. Non-Islamic system is “man’s rule over man.”¹⁰ He believed that the Pakistani system of his time was a human system which had contributed to social decadence. To reform the society, so he believed, a Muslim country must return to the basic principle of “Lord’s rule over man.” This means, jihad must be done to establish the true Islamic government.¹¹

Mawdudi is of the opinion that the Islamic system is instructed by God through God’s law. Islam is a complete way of life (*manhaj*) anchored in God’s sovereignty, and Muslims are people who submit to God and live according to God’s will.¹² Sharia, God’s code of law, is perfect and complete. It must direct all human systems. The people must obey and submit to all precepts of the sharia. Any society which does not obey the sharia cannot claim itself a Muslim society.

⁸ Abul A’la Mawdudi, “The Islamic Law”, in *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden*, ed. by Roxanne Leslie Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (New York: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 86–7.

⁹ Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, *Jihad in Islam*, 3rd ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976), p. 22.

¹⁰ Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, *Fundamentals of Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1975), p. 247.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 248–50.

¹² Mawdudi, “The Islamic Law”, p. 92.

Unfortunately, at the beginning of its formation, Pakistan was more inclined to Nationalism rather than to constructing an Islamic system. Although the political leaders are Muslims, Mawdudi believes, if they refuse to promote sharia in its fullest form, then they can be counted as enemies of Islam. Mawdudi rebukes those Muslims who oppose sharia, and says that they are opposing God’s sovereignty, the most fundamental principle of Islam. Those people have been contaminated by the West and Westernization so they regard sharia as an outdated law that is incompatible with modern context.¹³ On the other hand, Mawdudi emphasizes the importance of seizing political power in order to apply sharia to the masses. He says as follow:

If...leaders and rulers be pious and devoted to God, the entire society will certainly follow the course of righteousness and devotion to the Almighty. Even the wicked will be constrained to do good....But if the reins of [the] state are in the hands of agnostics and evil men, the entire fabric will be permeated by the spirit of disobedience to God, tyranny and immorality....God’s earth will be inundated by tyranny and oppression.¹⁴

However, in overall, Mawdudi has very little interest in institutions and mechanisms to limit the ruler. He believes a good Muslim ruler will bring good and will not produce injustice and oppression.¹⁵ This reflects his belief in Islamic institution as a perfect and unalterable system based on a divine decree.

2. *The Role of Non-Muslim Minorities in the Islamic System: Second Class Citizens?*

Mawdudi believes that in a predominantly Muslim country, the majority must secure protection and safety to the non-Muslims. Thus he writes,

Now we come to the relationship of Muslims with non-Muslims. In dealing with them, believers have been instructed not to be intolerant or narrow-minded. They have been commanded not to abuse or speak ill of their religious leaders or saints, nor to say anything insulting about

¹³ Roxanne Leslie Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds.), *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden* (New York: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 86–8.

¹⁴ Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, *The Moral Foundations of the Islamic Movement*, 3rd edition (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976), pp. 3–4; Euben and Zaman (eds.), *Princeton Readings*, p. 82.

¹⁵ Euben and Zaman (eds.), *Princeton Readings*, p. 82.

their religion. They have been instructed not to seek disputes with them unnecessarily but to live in peace and amity. If the non-Muslims observe peace and conciliatory attitudes towards Muslims, and do not violate their territories and other rights, they also should keep congenial and friendly relations with them and deal with them fairly and justly.¹⁶

Vali Nasr is of the opinion that Mawdudi makes two distinct definitions of non-Muslims. First, the *dhimmi* or followers of religions known in Islam and mentioned in the Quran as the People of the Book. Second, the non-*dhimmi* or followers of other religions unknown in Islam, for instance the Ahmadis, which Mawdudi classifies as “non-Muslim.”¹⁷ In an Islamic state, the *dhimmi* holds higher status than the “non-Muslims” but both are in lower than the Muslims who enjoy full citizenship.¹⁸

Mawdudi believes that, in anticipating critiques as to how non-Muslims might get same rights, Islam gives better protection to minority than any human systems including democracy. Islam guarantees complete freedom to minorities according to their religious law, a freedom which the Western cannot give. This freedom can be achieved if sharia becomes what he calls “law of the land.”¹⁹ In this, minorities might have the opportunity to manage their own community.²⁰ Mawdudi believes, however, that the society’s rule should be up to fit the Muslims, since they must obey religious precepts in the sharia —the normative law of the Islamic state. The minority should not demand the majority to give up their religious convictions, since the majority has granted them freedom to manage their community.²¹ It can be said that here Mawdudi incorporates the logic of democracy to silence his critics, while he also argues that Islam provides more opportunities and freedom to the majority and the minority.

Mawdudi also opines the circumstance of the *dhimmi*. Even though Islam does not interfere them in matters of faith, rituals, and custom, they have to restrain from practices which violates the Islamic outlook, such as: gambling, usury or interest, prostitution, and other evil practices against

¹⁶ Abul A’la Maududi, *Towards Understanding Islam* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1980), p. 144.

¹⁷ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 99.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Mawdudi, “The Islamic Law”, p. 106.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

Islamic values.²² Other examples are the prohibition for non-Muslims from preaching against Islam and have to refrain from any missionary effort toward Muslims²³ and all non-Muslim women have to observe standard modesty as required in Islamic law.²⁴ Hence, for Mawdudi, the community-law should not transgress the law of the land —sharia. Non-Muslims are free to administer their own community as long as they do not violate the sharia.²⁵

Non-Muslims also cannot be political leaders, since, according to Islam, leaders of the state have their authority from God. This means, his power is emanated from his function as the protector of the Islamic state and from the electoral mandate he received from citizenry.”²⁶ Mawdudi does not hold that a caliph must be elected from the tribe of Quraysh tribe. Rather, all virtuous male Muslims, regardless their backgrounds, can be elected to be head of the state.²⁷ Besides the head of state, there is a legislature organ (*shūra*) whose function is similar to that of ulama.²⁸ Thus, in politics, non-Muslims only have a very restricted role. They cannot be head of the state or even member of the *shūra*.²⁹ It can be said, thus, that the Islamic system outline by Mawdudi does not provide full rights and equality for the non-Muslim, since they are treated as second class citizens.³⁰

C. Muslims Minority Among Non-Muslims Majority: The Example of the United States of America

Islam is a minority religion in the United States of America. It was brought into North America during the period of slavery and later by immigrants. Islam, however, is growing very fast in the USA. The

²² Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*, p. 27.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Jackson, *Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam*, p. 104.

²⁵ Vali Nasr said that Mawdudi’s thoughts towards non-Muslims reflects the sharia teaching on *dhimmi* and Ottoman’s system of *millet*; Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making*, p. 101.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

²⁹ Jackson, *Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam*, p. 104.

³⁰ Abdullahi An-Na’im gave an assessment for a sharia based law and concluded that it violates the basic human rights because it discriminates people based on people gender and religion; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, *Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1992), p. 7.

United States Religion Census shows that in 2010 Islam has 2,6 million adherents compared to only 1 million in 2000.³¹ Another research shows the number of mosque is growing 74% from 1.209 in 2000 to 2.106 in 2011.³²

According to Edward Curtis, Islamism as a transnational ideology entered America after the end World War II and aligned with African American Muslim community. Islamism is brought by students, visitors, and refugees who came from Middle Eastern countries and South Asia during late of 1950s and early 1960s. They were well-versed in the thoughts of Al-Banna, Qutb, and Mawdudi and tried to spread Islamism. Saudi Arabia also invested funds to promote their missionary effort in America. American Muslims' reception towards Islamism, however, is varied and the outcome of the reception is not always exactly the same Islamism.³³ As in the case of Black Muslim groups, for instance, the idea of Islamism merged with their experience of discrimination, in which a different kind of Islamism was created.

The relationship of the American Muslims to the “non-Muslims” can be described in several ways. Here I show examples from socio-political studies, two of which are from African-American communities, and one from general Muslim communities.

1. *Shaikh Daoud Ahmed Faisal: A Proponent of Islamism*

Shaikh Daoud Ahmed Faisal (1891-1980) led one of the early successful efforts in spreading Islam in America. In 1928, he founded an Islamic center that informally known as the State Street Mosque.³⁴ In 1934, he purchased the Talbot Estate and changed it into a Muslim community, the Madinah al-Salaam, until it collapsed due to financial problem eight years later. Several years later, during his hajj, he made

³¹ Meghan Neal, “Number of Muslims in the U.S. doubles since 9/11”, *New York Daily News* (3 May 2012), <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/number-muslims-u-s-doubles-9-11-article-1.1071895>, accessed 16 Nov 2014.

³² Ihsan Bagby, *The American Mosque 2011: Basic Characteristics of the American Mosque, Attitudes of Mosque Leaders* (Washington, D.C: Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2012), p. 5, <https://www.cair.com/images/pdf/The-American-Mosque-2011-part-1.pdf>, accessed 16 Nov 2014.

³³ Edward E. Curtis IV, “Islamism and Its African American Muslim Critics: Black Muslims in the Era of the Arab Cold War”, in *Black Routes to Islam*, ed. by M. Marable and Hishaam D. Aidi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 49–53.

³⁴ J. Gordon Melton, “Daoud Ahmed”, in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, ed. by Juan E. Campo (New York: Facts On File, 2009), p. 181.

acquaintance to the King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud and then, in 1934, he started to put the title of *shaikh*, a sign of learned man in Islamic teaching. He received charter from King Abd al-Aziz to promote Islam in America through an organization called Muslim Mission in America.³⁵ Shaikh Daoud propagation of Islamism, however, had begun before the Saudi-funded missionaries arrived in the United States. He used several methods in propagating Islam such as publishing tracts, preaching divine justice and salvation only through Islam, and building congregations with solid knowledge of Islam.³⁶

In his book, *Islam the True Faith: The Religion of Humanity*, Shaikh Daoud emphasizes the primacy of God’s sovereignty through Islam and sharia over all human societies.³⁷ His mission is to convert everyone to Islam and to establish a government and law based on God’s revelation, the Quran. He believes that only through these means, peace and tranquility will be realized.³⁸ It can be said that Shaikh Daoud, since he wants to establish an Islamic order, is in line with the ideology of Islamism. To spread this vision, he chose a nonviolent way. Obviously, since Muslims are minority in the USA, this vision cannot be realized. Despite his apologetical tone against the Jews and Christians, whom he believes to be held responsible for the Blacks discrimination in the USA, his political stance is more subtle.³⁹ In the words of Robert Dannin, Syakh Daoud “rejected any hint of political subversion and cautioned his followers to avoid complications with the government and police ... [and] to obey civil codes in the United States”⁴⁰ This political standpoint has been seen as supporting the status quo by some of his followers, in which it is not radical enough to propagate Sharia. The outcome was they left Shaikh Daoud in early 1960s and founded several organizations.⁴¹

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

³⁶ Curtis IV, “Islamism and Its African American Muslim Critics”, pp. 53–4.

³⁷ Shaikh Daoud Ahmed Faisal, *Islam, the True Faith, the Religion of Humanity* (Brooklyn: Islamic Mission of America, 1965); n.p., quoted from *ibid.*, p. 53.

³⁸ Curtis IV, “Islamism and Its African American Muslim Critics”, p. 54. Shaikh Daoud spoke publicly about his thought in a statement presented at the U.N. General Assembly in October 1960; see Robert Dannin, *Black Pilgrimage to Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 64.

³⁹ Curtis IV, “Islamism and Its African American Muslim Critics”, pp. 54–5, 63–4.

⁴⁰ Dannin, *Black Pilgrimage to Islam*, p. 64.

⁴¹ Curtis IV, “Islamism and Its African American Muslim Critics”, p. 55.

2. *Elijah Muhammad's the Nation of Islam: Black Power and Islamism*

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is one of the most influential Islamic groups in America, especially among the African-Americans. They started to receive public attention in the mid of 20th century, especially through its prominent figures such as Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X. NOI's teaching was outside the mainstream Islam and, since the time of Elijah Muhammad, subject to criticism. Unlike trans-national Islamism, NOI has their own version of Islamism. Elijah Muhammad believes Islam as a way of life that permeates every aspect of a Muslim's life. During this period, he struggled to realize their Islamic ideology into the sociopolitical realm.⁴² For Curtis, NOI rejects mainstream Islamic authority that tries to impose to them the "true" Islam, and, instead, remains faithful to the teaching of Muhammad.⁴³

Elijah Muhammad believes that America is controlled by the white system that supports white supremacy and oppresses the blacks. He believes, many people perceive that to be "non-Muslim" is white and to be a Muslim is black.⁴⁴ Thus, the NOI exists within a society from which its members need to live separately from the American society. For Muhammad, the blacks are not citizens of the USA. He preached during the World War II that his followers must not participate in the war. Because of this, he was imprisoned.⁴⁵ According to Jane Smith, "the key for Elijah Muhammad was not integration into American society but separation and the establishment of a political and social unit in which whites would have no role."⁴⁶ For Curtis, however, this call to separate from the society was just a rhetoric and never realized in actual plan to establish a modern nation-state or emigration. Rather, Muhammad oriented such a separation only in economic sector from the white-dominated market and, for him, this was the sign of the true freedom for all Muslims.⁴⁷

NOI indeed ran a program that regulated both personal and

⁴² Kathleen M. O'Connor, "The Nation of Islam", in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, ed. by Juan E. Campo (New York: Facts On File, 2009), p. 521.

⁴³ Curtis IV, "Islamism and Its African American Muslim Critics", p. 59.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 63. He justified Islam/black superiority over the whites by using theology that amalgamates Islam and Christianity. See Curtis' analysis on Muhammad's theological aspect in Curtis, *Islam in Black America*, pp. 75-9.

⁴⁵ Jane I. Smith, *Islam in America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 84.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Curtis IV, "Islamism and Its African American Muslim Critics", p. 73.

socio-economy aspects of its members. Beside praying five times a day, the members should dress in a certain custom, kept abstinence from eating pork, drinking alcohol or other unhealthy foods. They must stop gambling, refrain from laziness, and obey other personal and social precepts.⁴⁸ Members could not practice intermarriages to maintain purity within the black race. They also had to give some amount of money on the regular base to NOI that functions like zakat.⁴⁹ NOI advocated self-sufficient economy with its “Buy Black” philosophy that incorporated self or community employed business to produce NOI products such as house-hold goods, healthcare, homemade food, and community newspaper.⁵⁰ Education is another aspect that NOI organized. They built NOI schools as an alternative for the U.S. school system.⁵¹ To boost economy, they built black nation-wide bank, black hospitals, and black-owned factories and farmlands.⁵²

3. *Integration into a “Non-Muslim” Society: Islamism in Transition?*

Now I turn to various thoughts of American-Muslims. How do Muslim minorities integrate themselves within a non-Muslim society?

First, total disapproval towards any involvement in political and social life based on the doctrine *al-walā’ wal-barā’* that instructs the Muslims to not assimilate into the institutions of the unbelievers (*kuffār*).⁵³ Proponents of this position believe that involvement in American society and politics will give bad impacts to Muslims and dissuade future generations to live in a God-instructed morality. Therefore, preservation of individual Muslim character and the unity of Muslim *ummah* all over the world is the main objective.⁵⁴ For example, the Hizbul al-Tahrir believes that, since the United States of America is *dār al-kufr* (the abode of disbelief), to live in the U.S.A. is only a temporary option. The current period is a transition toward the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate. Loyalty of all Muslims should be oriented towards the vision

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*; Smith, *Islam in America*, p. 85.

⁴⁹ Smith, *Islam in America*, p. 85; O’Connor, “Daoud Ahmed”, p. 522.

⁵⁰ O’Connor, “Daoud Ahmed”, p. 52.

⁵¹ Smith, *Islam in America*, p. 85; O’Connor, “Daoud Ahmed”, p. 522.

⁵² Curtis IV, “Islamism and Its African American Muslim Critics”, p. 73.

⁵³ Mohamed Nimer, “Muslims in American Public Life”, in *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*, ed. by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 169.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

of the Islamic caliphate.⁵⁵ Another thought for prompting involvement of American Muslims in politics is a sceptic belief that America national and international policies are never going to benefit Muslims.⁵⁶

Second, participation and assimilation in political and public life while holding their Muslim identity.⁵⁷ Jane Smith is of the opinion that American-Muslims' attitudes towards active participation in politics have changed rapidly.⁵⁸ Initially, many Muslim immigrants were strongly influenced by Islamist thinkers like Qutb and Mawdudi, who held strict polarization between Islam and *jābiliyya* society. They were reluctant to partake in any social or political matters.⁵⁹ For Muqtedar Khan, this reluctance took place especially when Muslim immigrant changed their identity to be American citizens.⁶⁰ One internal factor of this transformation is the rationality embedded in Islam that makes Muslims easily embraced democracy and pluralism while at the same time survive the attack of modernity and secularism.⁶¹ American-Muslims embracement of political and social participation is the second general position that is shared by more majority Muslims.

American-Muslims, as Yvonne Y. Haddad has shown, realize that “[t]he larger the community... the bigger its potential impact in the political arena and influence in policy.”⁶² In other words, if they keep a quietist or separatist position from the social and political discourse, they cannot change their circumstance in the USA and in other countries. This happened in mid 1980s when the question turned from whether Muslims should involve in their society to how Muslims might influence their society.⁶³ One noticeable way to implement the vision is through a development of Islamic organizations. While some organizations tend to refrain from political matters and focus in promoting Muslim's rights in United States and influencing society in general, other Islamic organizations included political issues in their programs.

Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) promotes the idea of

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Smith, *Islam in America*, pp. 184–5.

⁵⁷ Nimer, “Muslims in American”, p. 169.

⁵⁸ Smith, *Islam in America*, p. 185.

⁵⁹ Yvonne Y. Haddad, *Not Quite American? The Shaping of Arab and Muslim Identity in the United States* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2004), pp. 30–2.

⁶⁰ Khan, “Muslims and Identity Politics”, pp. 97–8.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁶² Haddad, *Not Quite American?*, p. 72.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

America as *dār al-da‘wa* (abode of Islamic call) as oppose to Islam as *dār al-kufr*.⁶⁴ They believe that America is neither *dār al-Islām* (abode of Islam) nor *dār al-kufr*. For this group, the primary goal of the American Muslims is identification with the universal Islamic community, yet, as long as they can promote Islam freely, they should engage the society and government.⁶⁵ It can be said here the contribution of Imam Siraj Wahaj. In 1980s he helped drug users in his community, served the poor through soup kitchens, and, in 1996, campaigned for a Muslim candidate to U.S. Senate.⁶⁶

Other examples are from Islamic organizations are the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and Warith Deen Mohammed’s Muslim American Society (AMS). These groups believe that American Muslims are part of worldwide Muslim community and, at the same time, the America pluralistic society. Both do not engage in practical politics but persuade American-Muslims to vote in national and local elections.⁶⁷ Their leaders believe that Islam is called to do good and to despise wrong conducts. Through this, they propagate Islamic humane values in American society. In doing so, they make a difference for Muslims not only in America but in other countries.⁶⁸

There are groups such as American Muslim Alliance (AMA) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) which promotes greater involvements of American Muslims in America’s political and legal institutions.⁶⁹ AMA (founded in 1989) encourages Muslims to enter various public offices such as mayor, state legislators, school boards, and American Supreme Courts.⁷⁰ CAIR (founded in 1994) is known for advocacy against discriminations in schools and workplace and anti-Islam sentiments in society through public pressures, education, and media coverage.⁷¹ Mohamed Nimer’s writes the rationale of the pro-involvement groups as such:

⁶⁴ Nimer, “Muslims in American”, p. 171.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁷⁰ Smith, *Islam in America*, p. 185; Haddad, *Not Quite American?*, p. 26.

⁷¹ Nimer, “Muslims in American”, p. 174; Kathleen Moore, “The Hijab and Religious Liberty: Anti-Discrimination Law and Muslim Women in United States”, in *Muslims on the Americanization Path?*, ed. by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 110–11.

Proponents of involvement acknowledge that all people who earn income in this country are involved in public life because their tax dollars pay for government programs. These programs affect many aspects of the lives of American Muslims. The more influence Muslims have, the better equipped they are to push inclusion of Muslim values and ideas in the formulation and implementation of laws and programs. Thus, it is not only acceptable but necessary to use such means as voting, lobbying, and coalition building to gain this kind of influence. From this standpoint, the challenge before Muslims is to mobilize their community for effective representation of America Muslim viewpoints.⁷²

Proponents of the involvement approach believe that groups who oppose social and political involvements in American society have misunderstood the Islamic law and cannot differentiate between *ibādāt* (act of worship) and *mu‘āmalāt* (human affairs). The concept of *mu‘āmalāt*, they argue, gives space for Muslims to engage non-Muslims in a society as long as it does not violate Islamic teachings—the Quran and sunnah.⁷³ The concept of *maṣlaḥa* (benefit) is the foundation on which any positive involvements serve the interests of the Muslims are built. When some American Muslims choose to live in isolation and abstinence from any social and political realms, this harms the Muslim community as a whole, since the community become vulnerable target of scapegoating and alienation. Moreover, Muslim communities in the United States also could not get their rights because they simply never put an effort to state their rights.⁷⁴ Involvement, so they believe, is the best mean to protect American Muslims rights and identity.

D. From Islamism to Post-Islamism: The Example of Indonesia

The discussion of the “non-Muslim” in socio-political discourse in Indonesia will highlight exuberate traits of transition from Islamism to post-Islamism. To some extent, it is more conspicuous than American experience because Indonesia is a Muslim majority country that has adopted democracy as its political system. Frédérick Volpi considers Indonesia as an example of the “pseudo-democracy” countries in the Muslim world, in essence, a different form of democracy when compared

⁷² Nimer, “Muslims in American”, p. 172.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 171–72.

with liberal democracy.⁷⁵ However, Volpi’s analysis is based on liberal democracy as a measurement to appraise Indonesian experience and it is arguably inadequate to understand a unique and dynamic relation between Islam and democracy in Indonesia. Instead of looking from liberal-democratic perspective, the transition from Islamism to post-Islamism might become better tool to analyze current situation.

Post-Islamism, as Bayat mentioned, is an attempt to look for a fuse between “...religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty.”⁷⁶ Post-Islamism also shows how a civil and nonreligious state coexists with an active role for religion in the public sphere as its most visible feature.⁷⁷ With a consideration on what happened in Indonesia between Islam and democracy, one can see how democracy is not an exclusive and monolithic system. Rather, democracy is a constructed system where Islam can be one of its materials.

1. *Traits of Post-Islamism in Indonesia*

Alongside Bayat’s view on the transition from Islamism to post-Islamism, Noorhaidi Hasan observes that Islamism in Indonesia is gradually changing to post-Islamism, especially after the fall of Suharto from his power in 1998.⁷⁸ Islamism got a way to flourish freely as one of the alternative thoughts in 1998 after had been suppressed for several decades during the regimes of Sukarno’s “guided democracy” and Suharto’s “New Order” (1959-1998).⁷⁹ This does not mean that Islamism never existed beforehand. Some forms of Islamism that intended to establish an Islamic state or Islamic system have existed even before the establishment of Indonesia as an independent nation-state in 1945. The debate to include Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) into Indonesia’s constitution in 1945,⁸⁰ the unresolved debate of Konstituante between

⁷⁵ Frédéric Volpi, “Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World”, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 6 (2004), pp. 1061–78.

⁷⁶ Bayat, “Post-Islamism at Large”, p. 8.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Noorhaidi Hasan, “Post-Islamist Politics in Indonesia”, in *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, ed. by Asef Bayat (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 157.

⁷⁹ Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), p. 206; Jeff Lee, “The Failure of Political Islam in Indonesia: A Historical Narrative”, *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2004), pp. 92–98.

⁸⁰ B.J. Bolland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 9–33; Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* *Al-Jāmi‘ah*, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2015 M/1436 H

Islamist faction and Nationalist faction at the end of 1950's,⁸¹ and the Darul Islam armed rebellion to establish separate Islamic realm are just some examples of Islamism in Indonesia.⁸²

The first trait is the decrease of militant Islamism. After its peak on the beginning of Reformation era, when many of its proponents appeared in public sphere and partook in jihad war in some conflict areas such as Ambon and Poso, their appearances gradually decreased after then. At the end of year 2010, the trace of militant Islamism has faded almost completely.⁸³ From a research done by Hasan, it seems some of their leaders have changed their opinion concerning jihad. They still believe that jihad is important and is required for all Muslims regardless of regions or circumstances. However, in the current Indonesian context it does not necessitate war-jihad but other forms of jihad. The reason they chose war-jihad at the beginning of Reformation order was because Muslims in some conflict areas suffered because of violent conflicts.⁸⁴ Besides them, a group, responsible for several bombings that occurred during the early years of Reformation, is also declining and almost all the leaders have been put into custody or killed by Indonesian special police detachment. Hasan argues that the global terrorist threat in the name of Islam, both in global and Indonesian context, has made some militant jihadist groups change their behavior as mentioned above. They did not wish to be associated with the more violent groups abroad and chose to focus their movements in missionary (*da'wa*) effort through peaceful means.⁸⁵ For instance, the supreme leader of the *Laskar Jihad* (Jihad Army), Ja'far Umar Thalib, who once rallied a para-military group to fight in Ambon, disbanded his group and nowadays is known as a local salafi preacher.⁸⁶

The second example connects to the growth of moderate Muslim voices in public discourse. Hasan mentioned the rise of civil organization

(New York: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. Chapter 3.

⁸¹ R.E. Elson, "Two Failed Attempts to Islamize the Indonesian Constitution", *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia*, vol. 28, no. 3 (2013), pp. 379–437.

⁸² C. van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).

⁸³ Hasan, "Post-Islamist Politics", pp. 161–6.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁸⁶ Noorhaidi Hasan, "Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts in the Salafi Movement in Indonesia", in *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, ed. by Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 185–6.

such as *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (Liberal Islam Network), the Wahid Institute and the likes as a sign of post-Islamism. Those people disseminate democratic values like human rights, religious freedom, and so on, in a public discourse through mass media, seminar, workshop, and other civic methods. Those groups brought a nuance in Indonesian Islam and gave people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, different understandings of Islam in democratic system.⁸⁷ In addition to Hasan’s observation, Mirjam Künkler conducts a research on how recent Indonesian democracy developed as a consensual discourse among Indonesian Muslims. Künkler shows the tension between the proponents of Islamism and Nationalism in social and political discourse but at the end Islamism was diminishing after the rise of Suharto. At that time, some prominent Islamic figures arose to undergo a synthesis between Islam and democracy, not in political level, but in social and educational ones. Those figures, such Harun Nasution, Nurcholis Madjid, and Abdurrahman Wahid, have largely contributed into paving a way in harmonizing Islam and democracy in social discourse.⁸⁸

The third trait of Indonesian post-Islamism is the transition of *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, Justice and Prosperous Party). The party is comparable to the *Adalet Kalkinma Partisi* (AKP, Justice and Development Party) in Turkey whose leader, Erdogan, is the current President of Turkey. Started as a Muslim student movement called *Tarbiya* in 1980s, PKS found their political momentum after the fall of Suharto. They founded *Partai Keadilan* (Justice Party) and participated in Indonesia General Election in 1999. At that point, their rhetoric was strongly imbued with Islamist ideals such as restoration of Islamic order and law. Unfortunately, they only acquired 1.4 percent of overall votes and did not pass electoral threshold.⁸⁹ After that, they gained more popularity and voters after being transformed into PKS that relinquished the Islamist rhetoric and put more emphasis on promoting social welfare and common goods based on both Islamic and democratic values. The result of the transformation is astounding as PKS always get around 7% of total votes in every General Election until now that make them as

⁸⁷ Hasan, “Post-Islamist Politics”, pp. 166–70.

⁸⁸ Mirjam Künkler, “How Pluralist Democracy Became the Consensual Discourse Among Secular and Nonsecular Muslims in Indonesia”, in *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*, ed. by Mirjam Künkler and Alfred C. Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 171–2.

one of Indonesia political powers.⁹⁰

The list of traits mentioned above is not exhaustive. There are more to say on post-Islamism realm of contemporary Indonesia, including how Islam has permeated mainstream culture and gained prominence in the public square.⁹¹ Since the purpose of this section is to illustrate how Islamism and post-Islamism coexisted in contemporary Indonesia, we agree with Hasan that post-Islamism has more favor in contemporary context. In the next section, the issue surrounding the rise of non-Muslim governor in Jakarta in 2014 will become a test case .to state another trait of post-Islamism in Indonesia

2. *The Case of Controversy on a Non-Muslim Governor of Jakarta*

Time magazine (October 27, 2014) took Joko Widodo, the new elected President of Indonesia, on the cover. Having promoted from the position of Governor of Jakarta to presidency following the result of 2014's Presidential General Election, Jokowi's (Joko Widodo's popular name) gubernorial seat is taken by his deputy, Basuki Tjahja Purnama a.k.a Ahok, a Chinese-Indonesian by ethnicity and a Christian by faith. Ahok's background triggered a public controversy for several weeks before his inauguration in November 19, 2014 because his promotion means a non-Muslim will become the political leader of Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, whose population is predominantly Muslims. Although Jakarta was once led by a Christian governor in 1960's for a few months, the political atmosphere and social context was completely different. In the Reformation era, Islamism has grasped a power in political and social realms and freely induced its idea in society. The public controversy involves notorious Islamic organization such as *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defender Front or FPI)⁹² who organized large

⁹⁰ For analysis on the phenomenon of PKS, see D. Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party", *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 65, no. 3 (2012), pp. 486–98.

⁹¹ In another writing, Noorhaidi Hasan shows how the phenomenon of *Dhiker Akbar* in Indonesia is related closely to the declining of Islamism that champion Islam as political end and the rise of post-Islamist piety in public square. Noorhaidi Hasan, "Piety, Politics, and Post-Islamism: *Dhiker Akbar* in Indonesia", *Al-Jāmi'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, vol. 50, no. 2 (2012), p. 369.

⁹² Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) is a socio-religious organization group that claims to protect Islamic values in Indonesian society. Their public activities including public demonstration, raiding places that sell alcoholic beverages, provide gambling, and others that make them notorious since their first appearance after the 196

demonstrations and spoke blatantly from Islamic point of view against Ahok’s promotion on the pretext of his personal faith.⁹³

Although FPI is a not a political party, their position in this controversy represents the Islamist position that prioritizes what they consider to be Islamic values rather than following the Indonesian constitution. In an article posted in FPI official website, they state that Muslims should not authorize a non-Muslim leader because it is *haram* or forbidden according to Islamic law, especially when the predominant populations are Muslims like Jakarta. FPI suggest all Muslims who support Ahok to repent and persuade them to join FPI in prompting Ahok to become the governor of Jakarta. To strengthen their argument, FPI use several Quranic verses related to the prohibition of taking non-Muslim as leader of Muslim people.⁹⁴

Another voice in the controversy is the Grand Imam of Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta, Ali Mustafa Yaqub. According to Yaqub, Muslims should not choose a non-Muslim as their ruler. However, he disagrees with FPI because the way that they convey their opinion leans toward anarchism and radicalism. Furthermore, in the case of Ahok, who has been chosen by people and his elevation is legal according to the constitution, then Muslims are obliged to follow constitution and accept Ahok as their leader, except if Ahok instruct people to do evil conduct according to Islamic teachings.⁹⁵ Yaqub believes that Islam does not instruct any specific form of government that can be deemed perfect and universal. Conversely, democracy might be compatible with Islam just like the example of Indonesia. He adds that substantially Indonesia can be considered as an Islamic country although there is no such label because in Indonesia Muslims have applied Sharia in many aspects of their life.⁹⁶

In one talk show on television about the controversy, Nusron Wahid, the Chairman of *Gerakan Pemuda Ansor* (Ansor Youth Movement), one of Nahdlatul Ulama’s youth organizations, rebuked FPI’s rejection of

fall of Suharto in 1998.

⁹³ Joe Cochrane, “An Ethnic Chinese Christian, Breaking Barriers in Indonesia”, *The New York Times* (22 Nov 2014), <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/world/asia/an-ethnic-chinese-christian-breaking-barriers-in-indonesia.html>, accessed 24 Nov 2014.

⁹⁴ “Dalil Qur’an Haramnya Orang Kafir Memimpin Umat Islam”, *KabarNet.in* (24 Oct 2014), <http://kabarnet.in/2014/09/24/dalil-quran-haramnya-orang-kafir-memimpin-umat-islam/>, accessed 24 Nov 2014.

⁹⁵ “Imam Besar Masjid Istiqlal Ali Mustawa Yaqub: Demo Anarkistis Haram”, *Majalah Detik*, vol. 55 (2014), pp. 23–33.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

Ahok. According to him, Indonesia is a country based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. It means that any rejection of a leader, who was elected by people, based on sectarian views like religion is irrelevant. Indonesia recognizes three types of laws: State law or constitution, Islamic law, and customary law. Among the three types, the highest one is the constitution. The constitution has regulated the mechanism to elect public officers, i.e., when the leader is unavailable to continue her office the deputy will take over the seat, so Indonesian Muslims are obliged to follow the constitution. The logic of constitution cannot be void by the logic of religion, including Islam. That is the reason, he asserts further, why in some areas of Indonesia where Muslims consist only in the minority the result of election might favor a Muslim leader and vice versa.⁹⁷

Nusron Wahid's statement on the importance of respecting the constitution reflects the position of majority Indonesian Muslims in general, at least as can be seen from two biggest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. For instance, Said Aqil Siradj, the General Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, made a statement that Ahok had been elected by people of Jakarta and everybody must respect that fact. In addition, he also advised Ahok to change some of his attitudes and speaking style that somehow spread relentlessness for some Muslims.⁹⁸ Muhammadiyah, another civil Islamic organization, has remained neutral during the controversy. Although some of their figures stated their support and appreciation for Ahok stating that Ahok has promoted good governance and anti-corruption initiatives, those are not the official position of Muhammadiyah as an organization.⁹⁹

Despite some rejection based on Ahok's personal faith, many Muslims believe that Indonesia should be governed in accordance to the constitution. It means that their acceptance of Ahok is not equal with that

⁹⁷ "Full Transcript of Nusron Wahid's statements", *Suara-Muslim.com*, <http://www.suara-muslim.com/2014/10/inilah-transkrip-lengkap-pernyataan.html>, accessed 24 Nov 2014.

⁹⁸ "NU supports Ahok as governor of Jakarta", *nu.or.id* (15 Nov 2014), <http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/55752/nu-supports-ahok-as-governor-of-jakarta>, accessed 24 Nov 2014.

⁹⁹ "Muhammadiyah Dukung Ahok Jadi Gubernur DKI", *JAKARTAJoss* (16 Oct 2014), http://m.joss.today/read/10775-Politik-Muhammadiyah_Dukung_Ahok_Jadi_Gubernur_DKI, accessed 24 Nov 2014; "Klarifikasi Ketua Harian PWM: Tidak Ada Keputusan Mendukung Ahok Jadi Gubernur", *Tabligh Online* (16 Sep 2014), <http://tabligh.or.id/2014/klarifikasi-ketua-harian-pwm-tidak-ada-keputusan-mendukung-ahok-jadi-gubernur/>, accessed 24 Nov 2014.

of accepting a non-Muslim leader per se but more about displaying fidelity to the democratic system and constitution. Furthermore, their perception of Ahok is not based on his personal faith but in Ahok’s competency to act justly, maintaining good-governance, improving people’s welfare, combating corruption, and so forth. Therefore, this controversy provides us with more evidence of post-Islamism in Indonesia.

E. Some Comparison on the Category of “Non-Muslims”

Mawdudi differentiate between “People of the Book,” whose existence is approved in the Quran, and “non-Muslim” such as Ahmadiyya. The second group suffers less tolerance compare to the first. However, both are deemed less than “Muslim”. Therefore, there is a hierarchy on citizenship in Islamic country that Mawdudi had imagined. The first strata consists of Muslim citizens, although Muslims who do not support Islamism will be considered less than the proponents of Islam. The second and third strata are for the “People of the Book” and non-Muslim whose rights as citizen are limited, especially in a right to govern as the head of the state. This is the reason some Islamic thinkers have voiced their dissent toward Islamism project. For instance, Abdullahi An-Naim disagrees with any effort to formalize sharia as the state law. Sharia as a codified law is inadequate basis for today’s plural society because it discriminates people based on religion and gender.¹⁰⁰ Instead of perceived not as an unchangeable law, sharia should serve as principle to construct modern law.¹⁰¹ This hierarchical thought also exists in the example of Islamism in America and Indonesia. Obviously there are adjustments on Islamism thought in those two countries because Mawdudi’s writing is an ideal one.

In the example of United States, Islamism as ideology took a softer form as Muslims comprise only minority in number. Shaikh Daoud, for instance, kept alive the objective of establishing an Islamic order, but he chose a peaceful means in propagating his idea by avoiding any subversive act in social and political level. Differ from Shaikh Doud, Elijah Muhammad maintain hostility towards the “non-Muslim” society of America that he identified as the white society. His understanding of Islam and blackness creates a unique form of Islamism that tried to separate their community from larger society of America. In their own

¹⁰⁰ An-Naim, “Toward the Light”, pp. 175-7.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-7.

community, Muhammad established an “Islamic” order that encapsulated all aspects of NOI’s members and improved the life-quality of its members. Obviously hostility toward the “non-Muslim” society then became an obstacle to penetrate Islam in larger society. That method is exactly an opposite of the larger portion of American Muslims, the third example, who gradually integrated toward the “non-Muslim” society of America. They wish for a greater chance in protecting their rights as Muslims in America towards while upholding an Islamic identity at the same time. At this point, the third example from United States share a trait of post-Islamism by combining Islam and democracy and emphasizing both religiosity and rights.

Indonesia as a predominant Muslim country has been witnessing a tension related to “non-Muslim” discourse in socio-political spheres since its independence until today. Despite some efforts by Islamists to change the constitution, whether at a national or regional level, the constitution today still provides an equal footing for all citizens regardless of their religion, including in political matters. Non-Muslims are free to enter the political fray since their right is guaranteed by law. Although, at this stage, that is more an ideal than a reality because there are various circumstances that obstructing their access in politics. The fact remains that non-Muslim cannot become a political leader in a system that is in accordance with Islamism. Appreciation of the political rights of non-Muslims and the Indonesian constitution above religious sentiment is significant exhibition of post-Islamism.

This transition from Islamism to post-Islamism underlines a fact that Islamism is a fragile ideology. Nurcholish Madjid, a prominent Indonesian Muslim thinker, has predicted that Islamism will only have a brief lifespan because of its nature as a form of apologetic towards other modern Western ideologies.¹⁰² According to Madjid, it is way to compensate Muslims’ inferiority complex against the West and seeks to demonstrate that Islam is superior or at least on rivalrous par with the West. Furthermore, Madjid expressed that if Muslims believe in the superiority of Islam in a spiritual or religious sense, they will not need Islamism to become Islam. Becoming a Muslim itself demands one to be creative in every sphere, including politics.¹⁰³ Therefore, the most befitting

¹⁰² Nurcholish Madjid, “The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and Reinvigorating Religious Understanding”, in *Liberal Islam: A Source Book*, ed. by Charles Kurzman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 292–3.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

role for Islam as a religion is to be the source or spirit of humanity and to guide human in the right path.

Madjid assessment of Islamism is similar to Abdurrahman Wahid's. As a leading figure of Nahdlatul Ulama, Wahid's firmness in defending Indonesian democracy with Pancasila as its core is very well known. For him, Pancasila and democracy are in accordance with the core of Islam so Indonesia does not need Islamic state or Islamic system. For example, the Islamic principle of justice is explicitly shown in Pancasila because it is a framework that guarantees the right of Muslims and non-Muslims in social and political matters.¹⁰⁴ Madjid's and Wahid's thoughts have contributed largely to the formation of Post-Islamist realm in Indonesian context. The role of Islam in public space and democracy are growing alongside with respect towards human rights, including the rights of non-Muslims as demonstrated in the case of Ahok. Despite strong preference on democracy that shaped the post-Islamist trend, however, I do not believe that the ideology of Islamism will be diminished completely.

F. Concluding Remarks

To conclude, from my research I have identified three types on how “non-Muslim” is described in socio-political discourse of Islamism and post-Islamism. The first type positioned the “non-Muslim” as an opponent. Mawdudi's appraisal towards the West and Nationalist supporters, Shaikh Daoud's objective to establish an Islamic order even with a non-violent means, and Elijah Muhammad's separation program are the examples of the first type. The second type comprehends the “non-Muslim” as second-class citizen under a category of “protected minority” like the Christians and Ahmadis in the thought of Mawdudi. Last, “non-Muslim” is perceived as equal citizen with equal rights based on law as demonstrated by American Muslims' involvement program and Indonesian constitution that enable non-Muslim to partake in social and political life without discrimination based on religion. From all of these, I have shown how Islamism always tends to marginalize “non-Muslims,” while post-Islamism takes a different direction

¹⁰⁴ Künkler, “How Pluralist Democracy”, p. 69; Mujiburrahman, “Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid”, *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, vol. 10, no. 3 (2007), pp. 343-6.

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