HOW DID AL-SUYŪṬĪ ABRIDGE IBN TAYMIYYA’S NASĪḤAT AHL AL-ĪMĀN FĪ AL-RADD ‘ĀLĀ MANȚIQ AL-YŪNĀN?*

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Abstract

Al-Radd ‘ala ’l-Mantiqiyin (an alternative title for Naṣīḥat Ahl al-Imān) is a work composed by Ibn Taymiyya to demolish each principle of logic as well as to unravel the depravity of their foundation. Probably due to Ibn Taymiyya’s being genius, when he destroys those principles, he could not avoid himself to discuss digressively irrelevant topics dealing with theological as well as metaphysical issues. In a number of passages in al-Radd, he could not even hinder himself to make a good deal of repetitions. Therefore, al-Radd ‘ala’l-Mantiqiyin is complex and difficult to use. The coherence of arguments that Ibn Taymiyya formulated is not solid and comprehensive. His criticism of logic is not penetrating as well. On the basis of my analysis of al-Suyūṭī’s method of abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd, I argue that al-Suyūṭī succeeded in rendering Ibn Taymiyya’s sequence of ideas superior to that found in the original work of the latter. The result of this study confirms Hallaq’s argument that the overall result of al-Suyūṭī’s abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd is ‘a more effective critique of logic than that originally formulated by Ibn Taymiyya.

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A. Introduction

A number of works composed by al-Suyūṭī to prohibit the study of logic reveals not only his unfavourable legal attitude toward logic, but also the fact that he is concerned with demolishing each principle of logic as well as with unravelling the depravity of their foundation. While his unfavourable attitude is reflected by his composition of ُّاْنْفِئَلَ ثَلَالَا مَنْقَيْقٍ وَلَكَالِمٍ 'وَنْفِئَلَ ثَلَالَا مَنْوَيْقٍ وَلَكَالِمٍ and by his issuance of the *Fatwa* against logic, his occupation for demolishing the principles of Greek logic seems to be represented by the fact that he abridged Ibn Taymiyya’s *Nashīḥat Ahl al-İ♠an fi al-Radd ‘ala Manṭiq al-Yūnān* (an alternative reading of *al-Radd ‘ala’l-Manṭiqiyīn*, forthwith called: NAI).

Although his concern for demolishing logic is limited only by rendering Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI into a concise treatise which is more comprehensible, al-Suyūṭī’s merit should be acknowledged for a number of reason: First, the study of his abridgement, viz. *Jahd al-Qari‘ha fi Tajrid al-Nasiḥa* (forthwith called: JQ), and the abridged work, viz. NAI, tells us the fact that al-Suyūṭī has succeeded in presenting the arguments of Ibn Taymiyya to become more comprehensible. Secondly, al-Suyūṭī can even be said to have rendered the sequence of Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments superior than that found in Ibn Taymiyya’s original work, i.e. NAI.

This paper tries to answer following questions: (1) When was *JQ* composed and what was the purpose of its composition? (2) How did al-Suyūṭī abridge Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI (alternative reading of *al-Radd

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1. In this work, al-Suyūṭī discusses the origin of logic, the history of its introduction into the Muslim world as well as the scholars who made use of it in their scientific enterprises. See, Ali, Mufti, ‘Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī against Logic and Kalām: Analysis and Significance of *Sawm al-Manṭiq wa’l-Kalām ‘an Fann al-Manṭiq wa’l-Kalām,* in *Hamdard Islamicus* (Karachi, Pakistan, 2005), vol. XXVIII, no. 2, p. 23-44.

2. In his *Fatwa* against logic, al-Suyūṭī prohibited people to study logic by referring to a great number of leading Muslim jurists of various sunnite legal affiliations. This *fatwa* has been edited and can be found in his *al-Ḥāwī li ‘l-Fatāwī* (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1959), vol. I, p. 393.
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‘ala ʾl-Mantiqiyyīn)? (3) In which way did he contribute to presenting Ibn Taymiyya’s argument more comprehensible?

Apart from an introduction and a conclusion, this paper consists of five parts. The first part deals with the date and purpose of al-Suyūṭī’s abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI. The second part is concerned with the contribution made by al-Suyūṭī in presenting Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments more comprehensible. The third part discusses elements of Ibn Taymiyya’s religious viewpoints against logic in JQ. The fourth part reviews the method used by al-Suyūṭī when selecting Ibn Taymiyya’s viewpoints against logic in the former’s abridgement. The fifth part will be devoted to discuss the rationale of al-Suyūṭī’s selection of Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments in JQ.

B. The Date and Purpose of Abridgement of Naṣīḥa

JQ was composed in 888/1482. This was mentioned by al-Suyūṭī in the introduction of ʿawn al-Mantiq, one of his work composed before the composition of JQ: “I related in it [viz. al-Qawl al-Mushriq fi Tahrīm al-Ishtiga l biʾl-Mantiq]3 that the Shaykh al-Islām, one of the scholars who has reached the degree of ʾijtiḥād, Taqīy al-Dīn b. Taymiyya composed a book to undo its foundations, which I had not found at that time. Twenty years had passed by without having found it. Then when this year had come, and I had told of what God endowed upon me in attaining the rank of independent legal investigation, someone mentioned that one of the conditions for legal investigation was the knowledge of the art of logic claiming that this condition was lacked in me. The poor fellow did not understand that I knew it better than those who claim to know it and who defend it. I know the principles of its foundations, as well as the insights based thereon equally well as the leading logicians of today, with the exception of only our very learned teacher, Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Kāfījī [d. 879/1475]. Thus I sought

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3 Twenty years before having written JQ, al-Suyūṭī had composed al-Qawl al-Mushriq in which he prohibits the study of logic by referring to more than forty prominent leading scholars who anathematized the study of logic. See my article, ‘al-Suyūṭī’s Contribution to the Historiography of the Muslim Opposition against Logic: with Special Reference to al-Qawl al-Mushriq fi Tahrīm al-Ishtiga l biʾl-Mantiq,’ in Bibliotheca Orientalis (forthcoming).
for Ibn Taymiyya’s book, till I found it. I saw that he had entitled it *Nasīḥat Abl al-Imān fī al-Radd ‘alā Manṭīq al-Yūnān*. In it, he expressed excellently his intention to undo its foundations one by one, while explaining the depravity of its principles. So I summarized it in a little composition which I entitled *Jahd al-Qarīḥa fī Tajrīd al-Nasīḥa*.”

C. The Contribution Made by al-Suyūṭī in Presenting IT’s Arguments more Comprehensible

JQ is an abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI. Al-Suyūṭī has abridged NAI, which, according to Hallaq, approximately consists of 138,000 words, into one third of it, viz. approximately 32,000 words. In summarizing this work, al-Suyūṭī did not try to reformulate Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas or give comments on them. “In other words, his abridgement is not paraphrastic: he simply let the logical parts intact and deleted the greatest part of metaphysical digressions.” However, according to Hallaq, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have succeeded in providing a more readable NAI to the readers, and in making it a succinct treatise. Besides, al-Suyūṭī’s omission of Ibn Taymiyya’s metaphysical discussions in NAI and his cleansing a good deal of the repetitions from the logical discussions, Hallaq argues, rendered “the sequence of ideas” of JQ, “superior to that found in” NAI.

In sum, Hallaq maintains that “the overall result of al-Suyūṭī’s abridgement is a more effective critique of logic than that originally formulated by IT.” This is in line with al-Suyūṭī’s own remark when he concluded his work, JQ: “This is the end of what I have abridged from Ibn Taymiyya’s treatise. I have conveyed his words *verbatim*, mostly without any change. I have omitted much of his treatise, which consists of twenty fascicles. However, I have deleted nothing of value; what I did delete was not pertinent to the main argument. The deletions are either digressions or replies to metaphysical and other queries, or repetitions, or refutations of some logicians’ views that do not have

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4 SM, p. 33-4.
5 JQ (Hallaq), p. liv-v.
6 ibid., p. lv.
7 ibid., p. liv.
8 ibid., p. liv.
bearing upon any universal principle in logic, etc. *Those who read this abridgement of mine will benefit more from it than they would should they take up the original work, for the latter is complex and difficult to use.*

D. Elements of IT’s Religious Viewpoints Against Logic and Theology in JQ

Although most of the passages of this work are replete with his concrete scientific criticism of each of the logical principles, there are some passages that can be regarded as direct expressions of IT’s religious attitude toward logic, reflecting his censure, condemnation and legal prohibition of the study of logic. The following passages will be devoted to record IT’s viewpoints against logic in particular or against the sciences of the ancients in general, such as philosophy insofar as they have been maintained in the abridged work of al-Suyūṭī, viz. JQ.

The first of these statements is very interesting, since it represents a cultural attitude shared by many religious scholars towards the sciences of the ancients in general, and against logic in particular. The statement says: *fa innī kuntu da’īman a’lāmī anna’l-mantiq al-yūnūnī la yahṣu’u ilayhi ‘l-dhaki‘a wa la yantafī‘u bihi ‘l-bali‘d* (I have always known that Greek logic is neither needed by the intelligent nor of any use to the dullard).

IT’s oppositional attitude toward logic is also clearly indicated in his harsh criticism of the philosophers who adopted the principles of Aristotelian logic. Accordingly he remarks that “even the [pre-Islamic] polytheistic Arabs possessed remnants of the religion of Abraham and were thus better than the polytheistic philosophers who

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9 For this translation, I rely fully on Hallaq’s translation of JQ. See, JQ (Hallaq) p. 174.

10 IT’s epistemological criticism of logic is reflected in his aim to deconstruct four main theses the logicians upheld: (1) *al-taṣawwur lā yumālū illā bi’t-badd* (no concept can be formed except by means of definition), (2) *al-badd mufīd taṣawwur al-asbyā* (definition leads to the conception of things), (3) *al-taṣdiq lā yumālū illā bi ‘l-qyās* (the judgment cannot be formed except by means of analogy), and (4) *al-burhān yufīd al-‘ilm bi ‘l-taṣdiqāt* (syllogism leads to the certain knowledge of judgements). The translation of these logical concepts are quoted from JQ (Hallaq), p. 3-174.

11 In discussing these, I fully rely on Hallaq’s translation of JQ.

12 JQ (Hallaq), p. 3.
adopted the principles propounded by Aristotle and his likes.”13

IT’s opposition against logic can be seen in his words in favour of al-Sirafī’s position maintaining that Arabic is the most noble language: “When Mattā complimented logic and claimed that intelligent people need it, Abū Saʿīd responded that there is no need for it, and that the need is rather for learning the Arabic language; for meanings are instinctive and intellective, and in need of no special convention, while Arabic is needed in order to understand meanings that must be learned. That is why learning the Arabic language – upon which the understanding of the Quran and the traditions depends – is, unlike logic, a religious obligation whenever such obligation can be fulfilled by the individual Muslim.”14

Ibn Taymiyya can also be said to have pronounced as his legal opinion that the study of logic should be prohibited. This can be seen in his following words: “The argument of the more recent scholars that the study of logic is a religious obligation incumbent upon those who are able to undertake it, and that it is one of the conditions which must be met in order to interpret the Law, is indicative of both their ignorance of the Law and the uselessness of logic.”15

IT’s opposition against logic is also reflected in his condemnation of the society among which logic was founded, i.e. the Greeks. According to IT, “the Greeks were polytheists and worshippers of stars and idols, much worse than the Jews and Christians even after the latter had abrogated and distorted their own Scripture.”16

According to IT, “Muslim thinkers continue to denounce the logicians’ method and expose its weaknesses, errors, intellectual inadequacy, and inarticulateness. They have shown that such a method is more likely to corrupt the rational and linguistic faculties than to set them straight. They are not willing to adopt it in their own reasoning or in their scholarly disputations, whether these disputations are conducted against a friend or a foe.”17

13 ibid., p. 68.
14 ibid., p. 100.
15 ibid.
16 ibid., p. 103.
In another passage, IT identifies the logicians with those whose knowledge is limited and with those who have no capacity in formulating concepts and clear expressions. This can be read in his following remarks: “The stronger the intellectual faculty and its conception are, the richer its expression becomes. But if the intellect and its expressions and concepts are feeble, the person possessing that intellect will be as if he were the prisoner of his own mind and tongue. Such is the case with the Greek logicians: you find them to be the most limited in knowledge and learning, the weakest in formulating concepts and clear expressions. This is why intelligent people who follow the path of the logicians when treating of the sciences employ methods that are prolix, compressed, affected, and arbitrary. All they do is to explain the obvious and clarify the intelligible. This may lead them to fall into all kinds of sophistry from which God has saved those who do not follow their path.”\(^\text{18}\)

His hostile attitude towards logic is also reflected in his dealing with an authority to whom IT himself referred explicitly as the first who mixed logic “with Islamic principles (bi uṣūl al-muslimi’n),”\(^\text{19}\) i.e. al-Gazālī. This is clearly indicated in IT’s words saying that “those who introduced this [essential definition] are the ones who wrote on the principles of religion and law after Abū Ḥāmid [al-Gazālī] - towards the end of the fifth century - and it is they who have discoursed on definitions according to the doctrine of the Greek logicians. Scholars of all other denominations - the Ash’āris, Mu’tazilīs, Karrāmīs, Shi’īs, and others - hold that the function of definition is to distinguish between the definiendum and other things. This is well known in the writings of Abu ’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’ārī, al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr [al-Bāqillānī], Abū Iṣḥāq [al-İsfarāyīn]ī, Ibn Fūrak, al-Qāḍī Abū Ya’la, Ibn ‘Aqīl, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, Nasafī, Abū ‘Alī [al-Jubbārī], Abū Ḥāshim [al-Jubbārī], ‘Abd al-Jabbār, al-ūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Hayṣam, and others.”\(^\text{20}\)

Accordingly, it is also reflected in his reference to al-Ghazālī as the one who was responsible for spreading the logicians’ method through

\(^{17}\) ibid., p. 111. \\
^{18}\) ibid., p. 87; NAI (al-Radd), 166-7. \\
^{19}\) ibid., p. 154; NAI (al-Radd), p. 194-5. \\
^{20}\) ibid., p. 12-3.
his works, including “in the beginning of his work al-Mustasfā an introduction to Greek logic, and as the one who alleged that the learning of those who do not know this logic is not to be trusted.”

His criticism of al-Ghazālī is also reflected in identifying the latter as the proponent of a logical concept upheld by the logicians: al-

ḥadd muṣīd tašawwuṛ al-ashyā’ (definition leads to the conception of things), a logical postulate which is opposed by, IT says, almost the majority of Muslim theologians from among the Ashʿarites, Muʿtazilites, Karamites and Shiʿites who oppose this postulate as can be seen in the works of Abuʾl-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, Abū Bakr al-Baqillānī, Abū ʿIshāq, etc.22

Opposing this postulate and arguing against its proponent, IT then puts forward a number of arguments maintaining that definition does not lead to the conception of things: First, “a definition is merely a statement and claim of the definer. The statement ‘man’ is ‘a rational animal’ is a declarative proposition (qādiyya khabariyya) and a mere claim devoid of proof. Therefore the hearer may know the truthfulness of this proposition before hearing it. This can be a proof that definition is not needed when one acquires the knowledge.”23 Secondly, “if the definer is not able to prove the truthfulness of the definition, the hearer fails to know the defined thing. Therefore there is no need for definition. Conceptualizing the thing defined with the definition is not possible without the knowledge of the truthfulness of the saying of the definer. The truthfulness of his saying is not known by a mere definition. Thus, the defined thing cannot be known by the definition.”24 Thirdly, “definition is not needed, because to form a concept necessitates the examination of the validity of the definition. Consequently apprehending the definiendum should be preceded by apprehending of that which defines it.”25 Fourthly, “the use of definition depends on whether the hearer knows or not that the definiendum possesses the attributes by means of which the logicians define the definiendum. If

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21 ibid., p. 111-12.
22 ibid., p. 13.
23 ibid., p. 15.
24 ibid., p. 16.
25 ibid., p. 17.
he does not know, he will not be able to form a concept of it. If he does, he will form a concept of it without definition. Therefore, definition is not needed.”

**Fifthly**, “seeking concepts necessitates awareness. Once the intellect were aware of them, it would not seek them, thus they need no definition. In short, it is awareness which is more useful than definition when one seeks and enquires a concept, since the act of seeking and enquiring presupposes awareness.”

**Sixthly**, “their understanding of the concept of definition is based on two invalid principles: First, a quiddity has a permanent reality, other than its own existence, subsisting outside the mind. This argument is similar to the one espoused by those who hold the non-existent to be a thing. Second, the distinction between what is a necessary concomitant to quiddity and what is essential to it. This principle has no truth in it. Understanding this principle would be tantamount to saying ‘the existence together with its necessary attributes’.”

**Seventhly**, “in a complete definition, the logicians require that a concept be formed of all its essential attributes common with other things. This means that all the attributes must be included. That is impossible.”

**Eighthly**, “requiring that definition must include distinguishing specific differences (*fuṣūl mumiyyizā*) along with their distinction between what is essential and what is accidental, is impossible.”

**Ninthy**, “definition is impossible, because its argument involves circularity: the apprehension of the essence will depend on the apprehension of what the essential qualities are, and the apprehension of the essential qualities will depend on what the apprehension of the essence is. Thus, if the definiendum cannot be known without definition, and definition is impossible, then the definiendum cannot be known. This reflects the falsity of their doctrine.”

**Tenthly**, “the disagreement amongst them concerning definition can not be resolved in terms of [their] principles; and what

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26 ibid., p. 18.
27 ibid., p. 22.
28 ibid., p. 23-4.
29 ibid., p. 27-8.
30 ibid., p. 28-9.
31 ibid., p. 29.
entails the equalization of evidence (*takażfu’ al-adilla*) [against and for the truth] is invalid.”

IT then asserts how al-Ghazālī’s introduction of logic into Islamic sciences led many scholars to follow the latter thinking that logic was the only existing method. Furthermore, IT remarks that “little did these thinkers know that intelligent and learned Muslims and others have denounced and decried it. Muslim thinkers have written many works about logic, and the majority of Muslims denounce it categorically because of what they have observed of its [damaging] effects and attendant consequences, which show the logicians views to be contrary to sound knowledge and faith, views that led them to all sorts of ignorance, heresy, and error.”

IT, however, argues that al-Ghazālī, as reflected in the books he wrote towards the end of his life, changed his views and maintained that the logicians’ method is false and leads to uncertainty. According to al-Ghazālī, IT says, logic led the former nowhere, “and has removed none of the doubt and perplexity which possessed him. To him logic was to no avail.”

Another typical remark by IT that can be regarded as having served religious ground for the opposition against logic is found in his following words: “What Muslim thinkers have shown in their discussions of the Greek logic attributed to Aristotle is that the forms of the syllogism and the subject-matter that the logicians have elaborated with great efforts are of no use in the acquisition of knowledge.”

Furthermore, he remarks “Muslim thinkers have held that logic does not lead to the knowledge sought after, and may constitute an obstacle in the way of attaining that knowledge because logic is tedious for the mind.”

In another passage, IT remarks that “Muslim scholars continue to write in refutation of the philosophers’ logic, and to expose the

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32 ibid., p. 30.
33 ibid., p. 112.
34 ibid.
35 ibid., p. 132.
36 ibid.
errors in their discourse concerning both definition and syllogism. They also continue to expose the philosophers’ errors in metaphysics and other matters. No Muslim scholar has attached importance to their method; in fact, the Ash’arīs, Mu’tazīlīs, Karrāmis, Shī’īs, and speculative thinkers in other groups have condemned their method and exposed its falsehood. Muslim scholars have since discussed logic at too great a length to be mentioned here. The refutation of the logicians is set forth in many a theological work. In Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbakhū’s work al-Āra’ wa l-Dīyānāt there is a useful chapter (fāṣihat) of such refutation.”

In condemning logic, IT also refers to Ibn al-Qushayrī’s hostile verses condemning Ibn Sīnā’s al-Šifā’:

“We severed the ties of brotherhood with those stricken
By the malady of the book of al-Šifā’
How often have I said to them
You are about to be swept away by the book of al-Šifā’
When they made little of our warning
We turned to God and He was sufficient
They then died while following the religion of Aristotle
And we lived according to the Religion of the Chosen.”

In opposing logic, IT also reports the event which occurred when al-Ṭūnājī was dying. According to IT, “those who were present at the deathbed of Ṭūnājī, the chief logician of his time, reported that just before his death he said: ‘I die knowing nothing except that the possible presupposes the necessary.’ He then added: ‘And presupposition is a negative attribute, so I die knowing nothing.’

In another passage, IT even condemns explicitly Ibn Sīnā, the fervent follower of Aristotle. This can be clearly read in his words: “What is meant here is that Ibn Sīnā said in his autobiography that his family, his father, and his brother were heretics whom he used to hear

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37 ibid., p. 153-4.
38 ibid., p. 173.
40 ibid., p. 132-3.
Mufti Ali discuss the intellect and the soul, and because of this he occupied himself with the study of philosophy. Nonetheless, despite the obvious heresy and inner disbelief of those Muslims with whom he is affiliated, their belief in God is greater than that of the ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle and his followers, whose knowledge of God is surpassed even by the [pre-Islamic] polytheistic Arabs.\textsuperscript{41}

In the same line, IT’s hostile attitude toward philosophers is clearly indicated in his remarks “Therefore the goal of the philosophers - if God leads them into some guidance – is the start of the Jews and infidel Christians, not to speak of the Muslims, the followers of the Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace - (\textit{wa līḥādīhū kānāt nīḥāyat al-fālāṣīfā - iḍīḥu ḥadābūn allāh bā’d al-bidāyā – bīdiyat al-yāḥūd wa l-naṣūrā al-kūfīr, faḍlān ‘ān al-muslimīn ummati muḥammad ẓālā ʿllāb ‘alayh wa sallān})\textsuperscript{42}

In the same line, IT’s censure of the philosophers can also be clearly read in his words: “Thus, the views of those philosophers became widespread among people lacking in reason and religion, such as the Karmatians and the Bāṭinīs, whose doctrine combines the philosophy of the Greeks with the religion of the Magians, although outwardly they adhere to the religion of Ra’fīl. Of the same stock are the ignorant mystics and speculative theologians. Being heretics and hypocrites, they find fertile ground in an ignorant (jāḥiliyya) environment which is far from knowledge and faith. They also find wide acceptance among hypocritical heretics as well as among the polytheistic Turks. They always find acceptance among the heretical and hypocritical enemies of God and of His Messenger.”\textsuperscript{43}

In concluding his discussion against logic, IT fervently attacks the philosophers (the logicians) revealing the falsity of their logic. This is clearly read in his words which read: “From the foregoing it has become clear that restricting the methods for the acquisition of knowledge to those which they have stipulated in logic is false, both in content and form. It has also become clear that they have excluded

\textsuperscript{41}ibid., p. 64.
\textsuperscript{42}NAI (al-Radd), p. 133.
\textsuperscript{43}JQ (Fallaq), p. 104.
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from the valid sciences those which are more sublime, more imposing, and more numerous than those they have subscribed to, and that the methods they have prescribed lead to only a few contemptible sciences that are neither noble nor numerous. Such is the level of these people – in their knowledge and practice they are the lowest of all humans. In many ways, the heretical Jews and Christians are more noble in their knowledge and practice. The entirety of philosophy does not even elevate its follower to a degree equal to that of the Jews and Christians after the latter have abrogated and distorted [their own Books], let alone prior to their doing so.”

E. How did al-Suyūṭī Select IT’s Viewpoints against Logic in this Abridgement?

Hallaq is right that when abridging NAI, al-Suyūṭī has left the logical parts intact and deleted the metaphysical digressions in IT’s discussion. Having compared JQ and NAI, it appears that the repetitive arguments of IT and his digressive discussion on metaphysical issues that had been deleted in JQ, however, contain relevant elements of IT’s religiously-based viewpoints against logic, the logicians, the philosophers, Aristotle, the Mutakallimūn, etc. The following are some typical examples.

To begin with, IT, for instance, says that “those who deal with definition (al-hudūd) after al-Ghazālī are those who deal with them following the Greek logical method.”

IT’s censure of the Mutakallimūn can be read for instance in his remarks that some groups of the Mutakallimūn argue against the falsity of the arguments of the philosophers with false and invalid arguments. Accordingly, he also condemned the Mutakallimūn for their arguing with the philosophers in a number of questions such as the novelty of the Universe (ḥudūth al-ʿālam), the attestation of the existence of the

44 ibid., p. 172-3.
45 ibid., p. liv-v.
46 NAI (al-Radd), p. 15.
47 ibid., p. 105.
Creator (ithbāt al-ṣāni‘), and prophecies (al-nubuwwāt), with the use of a false method which is deviating from the Divine law (al-shar‘) as well as from reason (al-‘aql).\textsuperscript{48}

IT’s censure against both the Mutakallimūn and the philosophers is clearly indicated when he speaks of “the mistake which the philosophers committed when dealing with metaphysical questions, prophecies, the hereafter and divine laws,” which, according to IT, was “graver than that of the Mutakallimūn. As for what they opine concerning physical and mathematical sciences is that the soundness of the philosophers is more often than those among the Mutakallimūn who argue against them. Most of the opinions of the Mutakallimūn concerning these issues are not based on knowledge, reason, and divine rule.” (wa ’l-khuṭa’ fīmā taqawwah al-mutafalsīfa fī ’l-ilābiyyāt wa ’l-nubuwwāt wa ’l-ma‘ād, wa ’l-shar‘ i‘ a‘zam min khuṭa’ al-mutakallimūn. Wa ammā fīmā yaqūlūnūh fī ’l-‘ulūm al-ṭabi‘iyya wa ’l-riyāḍiyya faqad yakūn šawāb al-mutafalsīfa akhbara min šawāb man radda ’alayhim min ahl al-kalām fa inna akhbara kalām ahl al-kalām fī bādhīb al-umūr bīlā ‘ilm wa lā ‘aql wa lā sbar)\textsuperscript{49}

In another passage, IT identifies the philosophers with the ones who are the most ignorant of God, the Lord of the Universe,\textsuperscript{50} and with those whose belief are similar to that of the hypocrites who adhere to the Islamic tenet only superficially refusing inwardly what has been prescribed by the Prophets.\textsuperscript{51} IT then shows their error in refusing the knowledge of God and His Attributes.\textsuperscript{52}

Referring to al-Ghazālī, IT also anathematizes the concepts of the philosophers dealing with the fact that God does not know the particulars, with the sempiternity of the Universe and with the rejection of the hereafter (inkār al-ma‘ād).\textsuperscript{53}

As for typical characteristics of IT’s digressions can be represented in a number of following cases.

\textsuperscript{48} ibid., p. 105.
\textsuperscript{49} ibid., p. 311.
\textsuperscript{50} ibid., p. 394.
\textsuperscript{51} ibid., p. 459.
\textsuperscript{52} ibid., p. 462.
\textsuperscript{53} ibid., p. 523.
1. Case 1

(1a) When dealing with a subject matter, IT usually treats it in details. When he discusses definition (al-hadd) and syllogism (al-qiyaṣ) by which a concept and judgement are respectively formed, he explains the definition of al-hadd and its being identified with its species: al-haqiqi, al-rasmī and al-lafzi and that of al-qiyaṣ and its being identified with its species: al-jadali, al-shi'ri, al-sufaṣṭa. IT then deals with each of those species of al-hadd and al-qiyaṣ, the discussion of which occupies more than two printed pages of NAI.54

However, IT’s viewpoints in this issue, that al-Suyūṭī abridges in JQ, are very concise. This can be obviously read in his abridgement: “You ought to know that they have founded logic upon the theory of definition and its species, and upon demonstrative syllogism and its species. They have held that, inasmuch as knowledge is either a concept (tasawwur) or a judgement (tasdiq), the means by which a concept is formed is a definition, and that by which a judgement is formed is a syllogism. To this we say that the discussion revolves around four points, two negative and two affirmative. The first of the two [negative points] concerns their doctrine that no required concept can be formed except through a definition; and the second of the two that no required judgement can be known except by means of a syllogism. The other two [affirmative points] concern their doctrine that [1] definition leads to the knowledge of concepts, and [2] the prescribed syllogism or demonstration leads to the knowledge of judgements.”55

It is clear that when al-Suyūṭī encountered IT’s lengthy discussions of a subject matter, he dealt only with the most essential passages avoiding the details thereof.

(1b) This also holds true for IT’s lengthy discussion of the fact that definition can be challenged by means of refutation (naqd) and by introducing another, opposing definition (muʿrada), the explanation of both of which occupies a couple of pages in NAI.56 Al-Suyūṭī, however, abridges it to become one paragraph: “Tenth, they argue that

54 ibid., p. 4-7.
55 JQ (Hallaq), p. 5-6.
56 NAI (al-Radd), p. 11-3.
the opponent is entitled to challenge definition by means of refutation (naqd) –through Coextensiveness (fard) and Coexclusiveness (‘aks)– as well as by introducing another, opposing definition (mu’āraḍa). If the hearer can invalidate the definition at times by Refutation and at others by Opposition, and since neither is possible without first forming a concept of the definiendum, then it becomes clear that the concept of the definiendum can be formed without definition. And this is what we sought to prove.”

(1c) The same pattern applies to IT’s argument against a postulate that “definition leads to the conception of things.” According to IT, this postulate is not only upheld by many scholars, among whom al-Ghazālī, but also opposed by many opponents, among whom are Abu ’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’ārī, al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr [al-Baqillānī], Abū Ishāq [al-Isfārā’īnī], Ibn Fūrāk, al-Qāḍī Abū Ya’lā, Ibn ‘Aqīl, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, Nasafī, Abū ‘Alī [al-Jubbā’ī], Abū Ḥāshim [al-Jubbā’ī], ‘Abd al-Jabbār, al-ūṣī, Muḥammad b. al-Hayṣam, etc. Furthermore, IT deals with the viewpoints of these prominent scholars on this issue, which occupies seven printed pages of NAI. Finally, he comes up with his refutation against al-Ghazālī’s viewpoints on this issue, for which purpose he devotes more than four printed pages of NAI. On this issue, al-Suyūṭī as reflected in his JQ dealt with it only in two paragraphs covering eleven printed-pages.

There are many passages which can be regarded here to have followed this typical example: par. 22, 23, 29, 30, 33, 34, etc.

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57 JQ (Hallaq), p. 10-11.
58 NAI (al-Radd), p. 16-22.
59 ibid., p. 22-7.
60 ibid. (Hallaq), p. 12.
63 Al-Suyūṭī in this passage records only IT’s indication that al-Ghazālī, Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī, al-Suhrawardī and others admitted “that definitions (ḥudūd) and names (asma‘) have the same defining functions,” without dealing with their individual viewpoints on this issue. JQ (Hallaq), p. 20-1; NAI (al-Radd), p. 40-49.
64 In this regard, al-Suyūṭī avoids to deal with detailed IT’s discussion that the knowledge of definitions (ḥudūd) is derived from Religion. Accordingly he also left IT’s
2. Case 2

Al-Suyūṭī, as suggested by Hallaq, can be said to have altered the text of NAI. This is typically represented in the fact that al-Suyūṭī, Hallaq argues, “speaks of the four eponyms representing the surviving legal schools, whereas IT in *al-Radd* [NAI] does not limit them to four, but speaks of *madhbāb* in a general sense, including the *madhbāb* of lesser *mujtahīdūn*. Thus, in addition to Abu Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/795), al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 204/820), and Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), he mentions Ishāq b. Ṭahāwī (d. 238/852), al-Layth b. Sa‘d (d. 157/773), al-Awzā‘ī (d. 158/774), and Dāwud b. ‘Alī al-aḥrīrī (d. 270/884).”

3. Case 3

In this case, without giving a reason, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have omitted lengthy passages of NAI. This is clearly indicated in the following example: When arguing for the fact that “a syllogism must include a universal premiss; but the universality of the proposition cannot be known unless it be ascertained that all the particulars under that universal share one common factor, and this is done by means of analogy,” IT proposes fourteen considerations, the ninth of which is omitted altogether by al-Suyūṭī in his *JQ*. This omitted passage (NAI, p. 396-437), however, records IT’s lengthy discussion “against the logicians who maintained that widespread (*mashhūrāt*), and to a lesser extent estimative (*wahmiyyāt*), propositions do not lead to certain knowledge,” and his references to the viewpoints of Ibn Sinā and al-Rāzī on this issue.
4. Case 4

Al-Suyūṭī has deleted IT’s metaphysical digressions. This is clearly indicated by the fact that al-Suyūṭī omitted 27 printed pages of NAI (p. 474-500) in which IT deals with a number of following metaphysical topics: the celestial soul’s (\textit{nafs falakiyya}) knowledge of earthly events (\textit{al-hawāḍith fi 'l-ard}), the falsity of claim that a Sufi could be informed about the content of \textit{al-lawh al-mahfūz} (the Well-Preserved Tablet), \textit{intiqāsh al-‘ilm fi ‘l-hiss al-mushtarik} (extracting knowledge of the celestial soul by the common perception of earthly beings, vision (\textit{ru’ya}), the Prophet’s knowledge of the events of the past and the future, the difference between the angel and the genie and between philosophical analogy and mystical fantasy, etc.\textsuperscript{70}

This also holds true for the last 44 pages of NAI, in which IT deals with following questions: the acquisition of the knowledge of the angels and the genie by the Prophets by means of their souls,\textsuperscript{71} the perplexity of the astronomers on \textit{ka‘ba},\textsuperscript{72} Divine and evil inspiration,\textsuperscript{73} the refutation of the view that the knowledge of the unseen (\textit{al-ghayb}) is not obtained through the intermediary of the Prophets,\textsuperscript{74} the difference of the theologians’ methods and those of the philosophers (the logicians) in the acquisition of the knowledge,\textsuperscript{75} reprehensible and praiseworthy perdition (\textit{al-fana’ al-madhmu’m wa’l-fana’ al-mahmü’d}),\textsuperscript{76} the anathemized concepts of the philosophers on the sempiternity of the Universe, the refutation of God’s knowledge of the particulars and of the hereafter,\textsuperscript{77} etc.

In response to these questions, al-Suyūṭī has made IT to deal with them only in two paragraphs (par. 319 and 320 of JQ)\textsuperscript{78} the first of which reads: “From the foregoing it has become clear that restricting

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{ibid.}, p. 172; NAI (al-Radd), p.473-500.
\textsuperscript{71} NAI (al-Radd), p. 501-2, 505-9,
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{ibid.}, p. 502-5.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{ibid.}, p. 507-9.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{ibid.}, p. 509-511.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{ibid.}, p. 511-523.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{ibid.}, p. 516-8.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{ibid.}, p. 523.
\textsuperscript{78} JQ (Hallaq), p. 173-4; NAI (al-Radd), p.500-545.
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the methods for the acquisition of knowledge to those which they have stipulated in logic is false, both in content and form. It has also become clear that they have excluded from the valid sciences those which are more sublime, more imposing, and more numerous than those they have subscribed to, and that the methods they have prescribed lead to only a few contemptible sciences that are neither noble nor numerous. Such is the level of these people— in their knowledge and practice. The entirety of philosophy does not even elevate its follower to a degree equal to that of the Jews and Christians after the latter have abrogated and distorted [their own Books], let alone prior to their doing so…”79 While paragraph 320 reads: “Someone may argue: ‘Some of the logicians’ views with regard to confining the methods of acquiring knowledge [to what they have prescribed] are found in the discourse of Muslim theologians. Some of the latter even espouse it verbatim or with changes in terminology.’ We answer: not all the doctrines of the speculative theologians are true. However, all that which the messengers have brought down is true. Whatever in the views of the speculative theologians and others corresponds to what the messengers have brought down is true; whatever does not conform is false. The forefathers’ and the leading scholars’ condemnation of the heretically innovative speculative theologians is well known.”80

Al-Suyūṭī also deleted ITS lengthy discussion of a number of other questions: the polytheism of Aristotle and the Greeks,81 the roots of polytheism,82 the belief of the Sabi’ites in Ḥarrān,83 the conversion of the residents of Ḥarrān to Christianity through the role of Constantine,84 the fact that all the prophets are Muslim,85 remarks on the statement of Abraham: “this is my Lord (ḥādha rabbī),”86 the

79 ibid., p. 172-3.
80 ibid., p. 173.
82 ibid., p. 285-6.
83 ibid., p. 287-9.
84 ibid., p. 289.
85 ibid., p. 290-3.
86 ibid., p. 304-7.
philosophers’ views that the souls are essentially identical, the attestation of the prophethood (ithbāt al-nubuwwa), the acquisition of knowledge by the soul after its being free from the body during sleep, the philosophers’ attestation of the prophethood, the philosophers’ view that the sainthood is more noble than prophethood, the arrival of the angel in form of human being, the philosophers’ interpretation of the angel and the revelation, the task of the angels, etc.

F. The Rationale of al-Suyūṭī’s Selection of IT’s Arguments in JQ

What is the rationale of al-Suyūṭī’s selection of arguments in JQ? Why did he in his JQ record some of IT’s arguments and delete the others?

Al-Suyūṭī stated that IT’s arguments that he has deleted in JQ are in form of “digressions or replies to metaphysical and other queries, or repetitions, or refutations of some logicians’ views that do not have bearing upon any universal principle in logic, etc.” He then added that what he “deleted was nothing of value” and “was not pertinent to the main argument.”

There are, however, other cases that cast a different light on the process of abridgement. To begin with, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have purposely limited IT’s frequent references to al-Ghazālī. This is clearly reflected in the fact that NAI records more than 28 references by IT to al-Ghazālī as the one who upheld the principle of the logicians, whereas JQ

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87 ibid., p.483.
88 ibid.
89 ibid., p.485-6.
90 ibid., p.486-7.
91 ibid., p.487.
92 ibid., p.490-1.
93 ibid., p.496-499.
94 ibid., p.499-500.
95 JQ (Hallaq), p. 174.
records only six references to him.\textsuperscript{97} This remarkable phenomenon may be closely related to al-Suyūṭī’s earlier assertion, as recorded in his QM, that al-Ghazālī has changed his view in favour of logic and become one of its fervent opponents. This can also be clearly read in the other works we are discussing in this study: i.e. SM and the \textit{Fatwā}.

Having read the fact that some of IT’s arguments which al-Suyūṭī deleted in JQ are dealing with theological questions such as the Attributes of God,\textsuperscript{98} His Oneness (\textit{al-tawhīd}),\textsuperscript{99} visio beatifica (\textit{al-ru’yā}),\textsuperscript{100} etc, it appears that al-Suyūṭī has made IT’s NAI to deal exclusively with concrete scientific criticism of logical principles and with the latter’s religiously-based viewpoints against logic. It is thus clear that when abridging IT’s NAI, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have avoided purposely to record IT’s discussion of theological matters. Here, attention may be drawn to the fact that al-Suyūṭī provided a separate work later, i.e. SM, in which he extensively dealt with theological problems and their relation to logical ones, as will be discussed in chapter three.

It is true that JQ records IT’s references to the theologians in more than twenty four times, IT’s reference to them in JQ, however, only deals with his censure of them and does not discuss their theological views as such.\textsuperscript{101}

This also holds true for the fact that al-Suyūṭī has deleted IT’s discussion of questions dealing with \textit{fiqh} and its \textit{usūl} such as question of \textit{qibla} (direction to which Muslims turn in praying),\textsuperscript{102} and that of \textit{ta’lil al-ḥukm}.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{97} Actually in JQ al-Ghazālī is referred to more than nine times, 6 of which was referred to by al-Suyūṭī as one who upheld the principle of the logicians. Four references to al-Ghazālī are made by al-Suyūṭī as one who “wrote treatises and tracts in refutation of sectarian and other groups” and as one who maintained “that the sciences of the philosophers are either truthful but futile or false suppositions that are not to be trusted,” as well as one who withdrawn himself from being occupied with logic, since it leads him to uncertainty. See, (index of) JQ (Hallaq), p. 12, 20, 46, 48, 111, 154.


\textsuperscript{99} \textit{ibid.}, p.214-224.

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{ibid.}, p.238-241.


\textsuperscript{102} NAI (al-Radd), p.260.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{ibid.}, p.236-8.
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In sum, the rationale of al-Suyūṭī’s selection of certains arguments proposed by IT in NAI might be closely associated with al-Suyūṭī’s purpose to make JQ to contain only IT’s concrete scientific criticism of logical principles and not IT’s theologico-legal as well as metaphysical discussions, since theologico-legal discussions were to be dealt with by al-Suyūṭī himself in a work composed later (i.e. SM). However, a question should be raised here whether or not al-Suyūṭī’s attempt at selecting from Ibn Taymiyya only the utterance related to logic not those related to theological-legal as well as metaphysical discussion is closely associated with his objective of abridging NAI, i.e. to show off his being well-versed in logic, his being familiar with its principles and his competency in differentiating theological and metaphysical subjecmatters from those of purely logical, to those who quentioned his competency in logic as one of the conditions to undertake ījtiḥāḍ. To the best of my knowledge, there is no historical evidence that could give negative answer, for an obvious reason, i.e., the background of composing this work was to strengthen al-Suyūṭī’s own claim for ījtiḥāḍ and taqdīd.

G. Conclusion

Al-Suyūṭī’s method in abridging Ibn Taymiyya’s Naṣīḥat is represented by the following facts: He left out IT’s digressive discussion and repetitive arguments. Besides he did not record IT’s discussion of theological and metaphysical issues.

Al-Suyūṭī can be said to have succeeded in presenting IT’s arguments more comprehensible. He has even rendered the sequence of IT’s ideas superior than that recorded in the latter’s original work. Therefore, his words claiming that “those who read this abridgement of mine will benefit more from it [viz. Jahād al-Qarība] than they should take up the original work, for the latter is complex and difficult to use,” ¹⁰⁴ are not an exaggeration.

¹⁰⁴ For this translation, I rely fully on Hallaq’s translation of JQ. See, JQ (Hallaq) p. 174.
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